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The owners of a business enterprise often choose to conduct
their operations in the form of two or more separate corporations
rather than as a single corporate entity. They may do so for a variety
of reasons: to separate functions for administrative ease, to control
many businesses with a minimal capital investment, to comply with
various legal requirements, to minimize liability or to insulate cer-
tain assets from liability for other activities, and, probably most
important, to avoid the predations of the ubiquitous tax collector.,
Most commonly, they will own stock in one corporation (the parent)
directly, and the parent corporation will, in turn, own stock in one
or more other corporations (the subsidiaries) .2 An alternative
method of organization is for a single stockholder, or group of
stockholders, to own a controlling interest in a number of distinct
corporations, generally referred to as "affiliates" or "affiliated cor-
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I See generally A. DEWING, FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS 980-87 (5th ed. 1953);
Cataldo, Limited Liability with One-Man Companies and Subsidiary Corporations, 18 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 473, 487-88 (1953).
2 The parent may be a holding company, organized solely to own corporate stock, or it
may also be a productive corporation in its own right.
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porations. ' ' 3 As long as all the related corporations remain solvent,
these forms of orgainzation present few, if any, special legal difficul-
ties. When one or more of a group of parent-subsidiary or affiliated
corporations becomes a bankrupt, however, a number of problems
may result from their interrelationship.4
This paper will examine the bankruptcy issues that most typi-
cally arise in the context of interrelated corporations. There are
three major problem areas. First, when a subsidiary or affiliate is
in bankruptcy, the propriety of allowing or subordinating the claims
of the parent or related corporations against the bankrupt's assets
will frequently be at issue. Second, in the same situation, creditors
of the bankrupt may seek to disregard the separate corporate enti-
ties and attempt to reach the assets of the parent or affiliate to
satisfy their claims. Finally, when several related companies are
bankrupt, there will usually be spirited competition between the
creditors of each corporate entity for whatever assets are available.
Although all have a common source in the division of one business
into more than one corporate entity, these three situations have
commonly been analyzed individually under the legal rubrics of
equitable subordination, piercing the corporate veil, and consolida-
tion of related bankrupts. A unified approach, based on the ration-
ale behind multiple incorporation, is long overdue.
Before turning to the discussion, some clarification of terms is
in order. The terms "enterprise" or "business enterprise" refer to
the combination of parent, subsidiary, and affiliated companies.
The ultimate owners of the enterprise-be they stockholders of the
parent or of the affiliates-are called "enterprise owners." The sepa-
rate corporations that make up the enterprise are either parents,
subsidiaries, or affiliates; however, when it is appropriate to refer to
such entities generally, the companies are called "constituent cor-
porations" or "related companies."
I. CORPORATE LAW BACKGROUND
Almost half a century ago Justice, then Judge, Cardozo noted
Because of administrative considerations, however, the affiliate form of organization
is only feasible when the number of stockholders is rather small.
When the parent does not own 100% of the subsidiary's stock, various corporate law
obligations may require officers and directors of the subsidiary to operate it with a view
toward benefiting the subsidiary and all its stockholders, including the minority. Berle,
Subsidiary Corporations and Credit Manipulation, 41 HARV. L. REv. 874, 889 (1928)
[hereinafter cited as Subsidiary Corporations]. It will be assumed throughout this paper that
no minority interests are at stake in the bankruptcy proceeding; this assumption appears to
accord with reality in the majority of the bankruptcy cases.
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that this area of the law was "enveloped in the mists of metaphor."'5
With his admonition to pay attention to the actual facts of parti-
cular cases, certain elementary factors of corporate organization
should be examined.
A. Investment Aims in Multi-Corporate Enterprises
The goal of investors in a single corporate enterprise is to gain
the largest possible return on their investments consonant with the
risks they wish to take. If the owners of an enterprise choose to
fragment it into several constituent corporations-and we assume
that they act as rational investors in doing so 6-then they must
believe that such a form of enterprise organization will maximize
the return on their investment, given their acceptable level of risk.
As noted above, in specific instances this maximization may result
from a variety of factors; no matter how the end is achieved, the
dominant motivation will always be maximization of return from
the enterprise as a whole.
Because the enterprise owners seek to maximize the profitabil-
ity of the entire enterprise in the light of acceptable risk, the profita-
bility of any one constituent corporation is largely irrelevant to
them, except as it contributes to the overall effort.7 In fact, since
corporate or tax advantages may be obtained by operating one com-
pany at a loss or at the break-even point, the return on investment
for the enterprise may even be increased by artificially depressing
the profits of a constituent corporation. Enterprise owners may thus
have an incentive to depart from the norms of financial organization
generally followed in the case of single, unrelated corporate units.
For example, the courts often speak of a requirement of ade-
quate capitalization for constituent corporations. Yet business con-
siderations do not always justify ample capitalization; in fact, there
may be substantial tax advantages in keeping capitalization at a
relatively low level. While it is essential that the newly formed
corporation have adequate funds to conduct its operations, from a
financial standpoint, the designation of such funds as "invested
capital" is irrelevant.
The same analysis applies to the commingling of funds or prop-
erties between constitutent companies. If such commingling were to
Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 244 N.Y. 84, 94, 155 N.E. 58, 61 (1926).
In many instances, however, the existence of multiple corporate entities may simply
reflect a historically established fact lacking real business purpose.
I See Subsidiary Corporations, supra note 4, at 882.
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result in inadequate accounting, cost control, or verification proce-
dures, it would certainly be detrimental to both corporations. But
there is nothing per se wrong with commingling if it simply results
in one constituent company using the funds or properties of another.
In reality, to the owners of the enterprise, free commingling of funds
and properties may be highly desirable in order to maximize overall
productive use of the capital and resources of the enterprise.
Different organizational norms may also be observed at the
management level. In a group of related corporations the locus of
decision-making authority will be determined by the needs of the
enterprise as a whole. Yet the courts often talk about the necessity
that subsidiary and affiliated corporations have a separate and in-
dependent will, as if corporations themselves had some sort of incor-
poreal existence apart from their owners. Even if a subsidiary has
its own management team, it would be naive to expect the enter-
prise owners to remain silent if they disagree with the subsidiary's
policies; if heads roll, there is no doubt whose heads they will be.
B. Corporate Law Protection for Creditors
If the owners of an enterprise were required to create and main-
tain a substantial pool of assets in each corporation they estab-
lished, the creditors of those corporations would be well protected
against the possibility of insolvency or bankruptcy. Existing corpo-
ration laws, however, impose few such constraints on the owners at
either the organizational or operational stage of the corporation's
existence.
While the courts sometimes discuss a duty to capitalize the
corporation adequately,8 the source and scope of such a duty is
unclear. State corporation statutes clearly do not require corporate
entities to be adequately capitalized as a prerequisite to engaging
in most types of business activities: no states have more than a
minimal capitalization requirement and none impose sanctions on
companies that are inadequately capitalized.' In all cases of inade-
1 See, e.g., Costello v. Fazio, 256 F.2d 903 (9th Cir. 1958); International Tel. & Tel. Corp.
v. Holton, 247 F.2d 178 (4th Cir. 1957); In re Lumber, Inc., 124 F. Supp. 302 (D. Ore. 1954).
1 See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-202(e)(iv), 48-514(1) (Supp. 1974) and TEX. Bus.
CORP. AcT art. 3.02(A)(7), 3.05(A) (Supp. 1974), art. 4.12(E) (1956), requiring a minimum of
$1000 initial capitalization and prohibiting a reduction of capital below that amount. Dela-
ware and New York have no specific requirement of a minimum amount of capital. DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, §§ 154, 242 (1974); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 102(a)(12), 506 (McKinney 1963).
Shareholder liability is usually limited to paying any portion of the consideration for shares
that remain unpaid. ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 25 (1966). See also Fuller, The
Incorporated Individual: A Study of the One-Man Company, 51 HARV. L. REv. 1373, 1393-94
(1938).
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quate capitalization, a creditor's ultimate remedy turns on the for-
tuity that a court will recognize a public policy obligation to ade-
quately capitalize the corporation as the "price" for limited liabil-
ity"0 and will permit creditors to press their claims against related
companies or against the ultimate owners of the enterprise. Without
inquiring now into the legion of cases involving attempts to pierce
the veil, it may be observed that the prospects of success are uncer-
tain at best.
Even if the courts do permit the veil to be pierced, however, the
net effect would simply be to encourage the enterprise owners to
make an educated guess at the amount of capitalization that would
insulate the enterprise and not the amount necessary to ensure that
each constituent corporation will be a viable concern able to pay its
creditors. Furthermore, this "sanction" does nothing to protect
creditors against undercapitalization by those who may be
judgment-proof or those who are sufficiently confident of the ulti-
mate success of the enterprise to ignore the consequences of insol-
vency. Thus the possibility of piercing in the future, after the corpo-
ration has failed, provides little incentive for capitalizing the com-
pany adequately at its inception. Through low capitalization re-
quirements and the uncertain prospect of veil piercing, the law has,
to a large extent, placed the cost of promoting new businesses on the
creditors of the corporation and, through them, on the public as a
whole.
The scant protections creditors receive at the corporation's in-
ception are supplemented by equally inadequate protections once
the corporation becomes a going concern. Of course, creditors are
totally unprotected if, for any reason, the corporation never earns
any profits. If, however, the corporation begins to accumulate funds
and property, creditors do receive some protection in the form of
limitations on the corporation's ability to withdraw those assets
from business use. While the corporation's managers may use corpo-
rate properties-however improvidently they wish-in an attempt
to build the corporation's business," there are some restrictions on
uses which do not further that business.
One such restriction is the general corporate law limitation on
the payment of dividends out of anything but "earned surplus" or
" H. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 129, at 302-03 (rev. ed. 1946); see Minton v. Cavaney,
56 C.2d 576, 364 P.2d 473, 15 Cal. Rptr. 641 (1961).
" At least as to the creditors, Berle notes that the classic rule precludes them from
complaining of mismanagement of the debtor corporation. Subsidiary Corporations, supra
note 4, at 877 & n. 3.
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"surplus. ' 12 But, since "surplus" is basically an accounting concept,
unrelated to the wisdom of paying dividends, dividends may often
be paid when it is improvident to do so. It is unlikely that such
dividends can be recovered from the parent unless the capital of the
corporation has been invaded or a fraudulent conveyance has oc-
curred. Although directors may have some residual liability for neg-
ligence in paying out dividends unwisely, a recovery is unlikely if
the malleable statutory standards have been met, since the pay-
ment of dividends available under the typical statutory "surplus
test" is a matter within the "business judgment" of the directors.,3
Since directors may be encouraged to pay dividends to a parent with
the knowledge that the funds can be "gotten back" if needed, it
should not be surprising that parent-subsidiary bankruptcy cases
frequently include intercorporate dividends."
The law of fraudulent conveyances, which provides a curious
sort of creditor protection, forbids various transfers without fair
consideration as well as transfers made with the intent to defraud
creditors.'5 There are three types of impermissible transfers without
fair consideration. First, transfers by a corporation that is or will be
rendered insolvent-that is, has or will have liabilities in excess of
its assets-are fraudulent as to existing creditors. As a practical
matter, the requirements of insolvency and existing creditors mini-
mize the protection afforded by prohibiting this category of transfer
since there is nothing to prevent dissipation of the corporation's
resources until it is in dire straits, and future creditors may not
12 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 170(a) (1974); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 510(a)
(McKinney Supp. 1974); ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 45 (1966).
13 H. BALLANTINE, supra note 10, § 252 at 591 (the statutory provisions governing divi-
dends are supplemented by the general duties of reasonable care and prudence in the manage-
ment of the corporation).
" See Henry v. Dolley, 99 F.2d 94 (10th Cir. 1938) (bankrupt parent's claim against its
bankrupt subsidiary reduced by the amount of illegally paid dividends). In other cases, the
declaration of dividends by the subsidiary, when it was without funds to pay them out, was
a factor in the subordination of the parent's claim in its subsidiary. See Taylor v. Standard
Gas & Elec. Co., 306 U.S. 307 (1939); Comstock v. Group of Institutional Investors, 335 U.S.
211 (1948) (dissenting opinion); In re Commonwealth Light & Power Co., 141 F.2d 734 (7th
Cir.), appeal dismissed, 322 U.S. 766 (1944). See also Fuller, supra note 9, at 1393.
Is Conveyances may be declared fraudulent under state law or under § 67d of the Bank-
ruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 107 (1970). Most states have adopted either the UNIFORM FRAUDULENT
CONVEYANCE ACT or some version of the STATUTE OF 13 ELIZABETH (1570) which prohibited
transactions that were intended to defraud. The purpose of the Uniform Act was, at least in
part, to codify and clarify the various presumptions and rules of law applied under the more
general provisions of the common law. Section 67d is a slightly altered version of the Uniform
Act. See generally Landers, The Bankrupt's Spouse: The Forgotten Character in the Bank-
ruptcy Drama, (1974) UTAH L. REV. 709. The textual discussion assumes that the Uniform
Act or § 67d is applicable; the results would not differ significantly in a common law state.
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attack such a transfer even though it may have impaired the corpo-
ration's ability to pay its claims.
A second category encompasses transfers that leave the trans-
feror, who is "about to engage in [a] business or transaction,"' 6
with unreasonably small capital; such transfers are fraudulent as to
existing creditors and as to those parties who become creditors dur-
ing the continuance of the business or transaction. While this rule
furnishes somewhat greater protection in principle, the courts have
not enforced the capitalization requirements very rigorously, 7 and,
as above, there is no protection if the transaction is completed be-
fore there are actual creditors.
The third category of fraudulent conveyances includes those
conveyances without consideration by a debtor who believes he will
incur debts beyond his ability to pay; such a transfer is fraudulent
whether there are existing or future creditors. Again, only minimal
protection is provided for creditors against proverbially optimistic
debtors who see the dim light at the end of an ever-lengthening
tunnel. In addition to the foregoing, conveyances for consideration
may be attacked if the debtor had actual fraudulent intent. Such a
finding is perhaps unlikely in the corporate context.
Outside of these rather narrow restrictions, the corporation is
permitted to carry out transactions that do not benefit it and yet
are not subject to attack. 8 Moreover, even when the law of
fraudulent conveyances operates, creditors receive only minimal
protection: the managers of the enterprise are generally not person-
ally liable, 9 and the statute of limitations may bar an attack on
" Bankruptcy Act § 67d(2)(b), 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(2)(b) (1970), UNIFORM FRAUDULENT
CONVEYANCES Act § 5.
" See Barr & Creelman Mill & Plumbing Supply Co. v. Zoller, 109 F.2d 924 (2d Cir.
1940) (court found no fraudulent conveyance even though when the subsidiary paid the
parent's debt its capital was only $1000 and its assets were never more than its liabilities).
There are few cases involving a fraudulent conveyance by a debtor with unreasonably small
capital, and virtually all of them also appear to fit within one of the other categories of
fraudulent conveyances. See Steph v. Branch, 255 F. Supp. 526 (E.D. Okla. 1966), af'd, 389
F.2d 233 (10th Cir. 1968) (also conveyance by insolvent without fair consideration); In re Atlas
Foundry Co., 155 F. Supp. 615 (D.N.J. 1957) (also an illegal circumvention of prohibitions
against mortgaging a company's assets to finance purchase of its stock); 4 H. REMINGTON,
BANKRUPTCY § 1644 (Henderson ed. 1957).
" See Fuller, supra note 9, at 1389-94 (reaching the same conclusion for one-man corpo-
rations).
11 Neither § 67d of the Bankruptcy Act nor the Uniform Act provides for liability on the
part of corporate officers of the transferor. While officers and directors might theoretically
be liable as tort-feasors, no precedent to this effect has been found. Finally, while some states
have enacted statutes imposing penalties on any party participating in such transfers, vir-
tually all of the reported cases are more than a half century old. See generally 37 C.J.S.
Fraudulent Conveyances §§ 466-68 (1943).
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transfers more than one year earlier. 0
Since any gratuitous distribution to a related company consti-
tutes a dividend, 2' the law of fraudulent conveyances provides little
protection for creditors beyond that already provided in state corpo-
ration statutes forbidding dividends that invade capital or that will
render a corporation insolvent. This law operates independently
only when payment of the dividend will leave the corporation in a
highly precarious financial position-that is, without adequate cap-
italization to carry on its business or at the edge of insolvency.
Two points emerge from the foregoing discussion: first, when
the owners of an enterprise operate it as separate constituent corpo-
rations, they have strong business motivations to operate those cor-
porations with a view toward overall return on investment, without
regard to the separate entity status each enjoys under the law; sec-
ond, the law governing the formation and maintenance of corpora-
tions provides minimal protection for creditors of such constituent
corporations by failing to mandate the formation and continuance
of a viable corporate entity able to pay its debts. Under this system,
the law relies primarily upon creditors to act to protect themselves
and, on occasion, to bear the losses associated with one attribute of
separate entity status-limited stockholder liability. Such a result
would be explicable only if it reflected a policy judgment that the
public benefits of corporate formation outweigh any harm to indi-
vidual creditors of those corporations that do not survive.
C. Special Problems of Creditors of Multi-Corporate Enterprises
Although the law gives little protection to creditors of corpora-
tions generally, quite apart from the special problem of the multi-
corporate enterprise, creditors of a constituent corporation may be
exposed to greater risks than creditors of a single corporation. 2
20 The statute of limitations under § 67d is one year. Under state law, either the statute
may vary or the equitable doctrine of laches may apply. See Landers, supra note 15, at 732.
" For a discussion of the relationship between illegal dividends, fraudulent conveyances,
and other sections of the Bankruptcy Act see W. CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS
1489-90 (1969).
22 It bears noting that there may be various types of creditors seeking to recover from
one or more of the constituent corporations. First, there are what might be called "voluntary
creditors," that is, creditors who had some element of choice before entering into the transac-
tion with a constituent company. Among such creditors are those who did investigate the
credit-worthiness of the corporate debtor, those who did not investigate but who could have
done so, and those who could not have been reasonably expected to inquire. In the latter
category are relatively small buyers and sellers of goods who ordinarily fill orders without
detailed inquiry. Superimposed upon the categories of creditors who either investigated or
might have done so are creditors who may, in one way or another, have relied or not relied
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First, the availability of funds from other corporations reduces the
practical importance of adequate initial capitalization: constituent
corporations can attract investments from related corporations
more easily than new capital could be raised from groups of stock-
holders. Second, the danger of commingling assets and properties
is greater between corporations themselves, than between corpora-
tions and shareholders. Third, there is a greater chance that, be-
cause its economic viability is tied to that of other corporations, the
constituent corporation will be unable to develop the kind of inde-
pendent profit-making activities that might be expected of single
corporate units. In the final analysis, the subsidiary will be respon-
sive to the dictates of the owners of the enterprise, who will be most
interested in the overall return on their investment.
It is the thesis of this paper that, when any constituent corpora-
tion becomes bankrupt, the legal relations between the constituent
companies should be determined in accordance with both the policy
behind the various legal requirements and the business realities that
motivate the managers of the corporation. Unfortunately, an exami-
nation of the relevant authorities suggests that many decisions in
this area are being premised upon largely mythical corporate poli-
cies and practices. All too often the practical workings of the corpo-
rate enterprise are ignored and factors having no significance apart
from bankruptcy are made determinative.
I[. EQUITABLE SUBORDINATION OF CLAIMS
The present doctrine governing the subordination of claims of
parent and affiliated corporations in the bankruptcy of a subsidiary
or affiliate is based on two essential premises. First, there is the rule
that the claim of the parent or affiliate will generally be allowed.
The rationale for this rule is that the relationship between the
claimant and the bankrupt is not enough, by itself, to overturn the
normal consequences of separate corporate status. Second, the ex-
ception to this rule is that where the parent or the affiliate has
on the presence or responsibility of other constituent companies to satisfy their claims if
necessary. The relying group includes those creditors who directly relied on the misrepresen-
tation that another constituent company would pay or guarantee the debt, or that certain
property belonged to the debtor that in fact belonged to another constituent company, be-
longed to the debtor, or those who relied on the appearance of strength given by a group of
companies or even on the similarity of names between the debtor and its affiliates. These
categories are not, of course, exclusive, and an infinite number of shadings and individual
factual patterns may exist. The second group of creditors might be termed "involuntary"
because they did not choose to enter into a transaction with the debtor company. The most
common example of such creditors are accident victims or other tort plaintiffs.
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somehow abused its dominant position, its claim will be subordi-
nated or disallowed. To date, most of the learning has been ad-
dressed to this second issue, namely, the question of what consti-
tutes a sufficient abuse of control to warrant subordination. In the
past three generations, there have been a number of modifica-
tions-with varying degrees of subtlety-in the controlling verbal
formulae; no purpose would be served by recounting the hoary de-
tails of that process of evolution. Instead, the present state of the
law may be summarized as follows: some courts have decided the
issue largely in conclusory terms by determining that the subsidiary
or affiliate is an "instrumentality," "mere instrumentality," or
"alter ego '2 3 of the claimant, suggesting a parasitic relationship
between the bankrupt and the claimant. Other courts have at-
tempted to catalogue the applicable factors that, singly or in con-
junction, warrant subordination.? While a complete list would be
impossible, the major factors are: (1) fraud or other wrongdoing; (2)
mismanagement in excess of simple negligence; (3) undercapital-
ization; (4) commingling of funds and properties; (5) failure to de-
velop the subsidiary into an independently profitable business,
and/or an overdependence of the business of the bankrupt upon that
of the claimant; and (6) excessive control, indicated by a failure to
observe the formalities of separate corporations.
The fluidity of these concepts has permitted an ad hoc ap-
proach to the problem of subordination, spearheaded by the deci-
sions of the Supreme Court itself. In the famous Deep Rock case, 25
the Court subordinated the claim of a parent corporation that had
seriously undercapitalized its subsidiary and had run the subsidi-
ary's business in such a manner as to make profitability unlikely.
In Pepper v. Litton,2 the Court concluded a long exegesis on truth,
The "instrumentality" language was apparently first used in In re Watertown Paper
Co., 169 F. 252 (2d Cir. 1909). See also In re Kentucky Wagon Mfg. Co., 71 F.2d 802 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 612 (1934); In re Ostego Waxed Paper Co., 14 F. Supp. 15 (W.D.
Mich. 1935). While the courts no longer rely on agency principles and subordinate rather than
disallow the claims of parent corporations; see In re Loewer's Gambrinus Brewery Co., 167
F.2d 318, 320 (2d Cir. 1948) (L. Hand, J. concurring), they still use the terms "instrumental-
ity" and "alter ego" to both state the problem and describe their conclusion. See, e.g.,
Markow v. Alcock, 356 F.2d 194 (5th Cir. 1966); American Trading & Production Corp. v.
Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 412 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
24 Some of the more useful discussions of these issues are Gleick, Subordination of Claims
in Bankruptcy Under the Equitable Power of the Bankruptcy Court, 16 Bus. LAW. 611, 619
(1961); Herzog & Zweibel, The Equitable Subordination of Claims in Bankruptcy, 15 VAND.
L. REV. 83, 90-113 (1961); Krotinger, The "Deep Rock" Doctrine: A Realistic Approach to
Parent-Subsidiary Law, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 1124 (1942); Rembar, Claims Against Affiliated
Companies in Reorganization, 39 COLUM. L. REV. 907, 922 (1939):
2 Taylor v. Standard Gas & Elec. Co., 306 U.S. 307 (1939).
2- 308 U.S. 295 (1939).
[42:589
Related Corporations in Bankruptcy
justice, and fair treatment of creditors by subordinating the claim
of a controlling shareholder because of conduct designed to deprive
the sole creditor of any participation in the bankrupt's estate. The
hundreds of lower court cases involving the same question seem to
turn on individual patterns, with the courts constantly emphasizing
that each case must be decided on its own facts.21
Rarely, if ever, does a court question the major premise of the
subordination doctrine that, absent one or more of these subordinat-
ing factors, the claims of parent and affiliated corporations must be
allowed to compete with claims of outside creditors for the assets of
the bankrupt. The premise is vulnerable to two separate attacks.
First, since the owners of the enterprise are concerned with maxim-
izing return on their investment commensurate with the desired
risk, any loan to the subsidiary or affiliate must be designed to
maximize overall profits and thus is inherently more like risk capital
than ordinary debt. Given that it is essentially risk capital, the
"debt" owed to the related corporation should not be permitted to
share pari passu with the true debts owed to other creditors.28 Sec-
ond, since the enterprise owner is concerned with maximizing return
on his entire investment, decisions regarding the operation of the
subsidiary or affiliate will be made with that goal in mind-not with
a view to ensuring that the subsidiary will function as a viable
corporate entity. Thus, in terms of the traditional test outlined
above, the economic reality of the situation gives rise to a presump-
tion that the parent has not used its control in the best interests of
the subsidiary. To ensure that the creditors are treated fairly, the
claim of the parent or affiliate must be subordinated.29
27 See, e.g., Centmont Corp. v. Marsch, 68 F.2d 460, 463 (1st Cir. 1933), cert. denied,
291 U.S. 680 (1934).
2 See the concurring opinion of Judge Learned Hand in In re Loewer's Gambrinus
Brewery Co., 167 F.2d 318, 320 (2d Cir. 1948), arguing that it would be inequitable for a
stockholder-creditor to enjoy all the gains of a successful business, yet limit his potential risks
in a failing business to those of a creditor.
2 Judge Frank, in In re Loewer's Gambrinus Brewery Co., 167 F.2d 318 (2d Cir. 1948),
writing for the majority, stated that creditors would not be required to prove an abuse of the
corporate form in the case of affiliate corporations because the potential for abuse and the
likelihood of concealment were so great. Judge Frank's opinion was apparently inspired by
the Supreme Court's decision in Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 313 (1939), which, however,
left open the same question as to one-man corporations. In Schwartz v. Mills, 192 F.2d 727
(2d Cir. 1948) (Frank, J., dissenting) the majority of the Second Circuit apparently aban-
doned the presumptive rule set forth in Gambrinus. See also Berle, The Theory of Enterprise
Entity, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 343, 356 (1947) [hereinafter cited as Enterprise Entity].
It has been noted that in many cases creditors might have been better off if the share-
holder had not infused additional funds into the bankrupt; future creditors would obviously
have been much better off. See Barlow v. Budge, 127 F.2d 440, 445 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
317 U.S. 647 (1942); N. LATTiN, R. JENNINGS, R. BUXBAUM, CORPORATIONS CASES AND MATERIALS
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A. An Analysis of the Current Subordination Doctrine
Examination of two border-line cases will show that the present
approach to the issue of subordination of the claims of a corporation
in the bankruptcy of a related corporation is unsatisfactory. First,
in Comstock v. Group of Institutional Investors" the Supreme Court
upheld, by a five to four majority, the claim of the Missouri Pacific
Railway Company (Mopac) in the assets of its subsidiary, the New
Orleans Texas and Mexico Railway Company, in reorganization
proceedings involving both corporations. The claim, as described by
the dissenting justices, was for: (1) advances by Mopac to the New
Orleans that were used almost immediately to pay dividends back
to Mopac; (2) a debt, assumed by the New Orleans, which another
subsidiary had allegedly owed to Mopac, although its obligation to
pay was questionable; and (3) loans that had been used to acquire
certain feeder lines that were arguably of little benefit to the New
Orleans, but were probably of use to other lines in the Mopac sys-
tem.3 ' The majority held that domination by the parent could not
by itself require subordinating its claim, but would warrant subordi-
nation if coupled with a breach of fiduciary duty to the subsidiary.
In this case, the corporate law authorized the payment of dividends
under the circumstances, and Mopac had not been unjustly en-
riched by the transactions. Moreover, the majority accepted the
finding of the lower courts that Mopac had administered the affairs
of the New Orleans in good faith and to its overall benefit; accord-
ingly the claims of the parent were allowed full participation in the
reorganization. 32
The four dissenting justices argued that Mopac's "good faith"
alone did not justify the allowance of its claim; the transactions
creating the debt, they stated, had to be essentially fair to the
controlled corporation-that is, in the nature of an arm's length
bargain. Applying this standard, the dissenters found that the por-
tion of the claim based on the loan used to make dividend payments
should have been subordinated because Mopac's cash position was
unaffected by the transaction while the New Orleans acquired a
liability without an offsetting benefit. Further, they found that
Mopac's claim on the transferred debt should be subordinated be-
cause the transaction benefited only Mopac; it acquired a more
153 (4th ed. 1968). The parent corporation does not, however, share the perspective of other
creditors.
30 335 U.S. 211 (1948).
' Id. at 240-51.
32 Id. at 228-30.
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secure debtor in the New Orleans while the New Orleans became
liable for another's debt. The third claim-for loans used to acquire
feeder lines-was permissible in the dissenters' view since the deci-
sion to acquire the lines had been essentially a matter of business
judgment, and the New Orleans could make the acquisition since
it was a holding company in the Mopac system.33
The second case is Gannett Co. v. Larry,34 in which Gannett, a
newspaper publisher, purchased the stock of a paper manufacturer.
This business, operated as a subsidiary, was then partially con-
verted into manufacturing newsprint in order to protect the parent
publishing company against an expected future shortage of news-
print. When the shortage failed to materialize and Gannett realized
that the business could never be operated profitably, it stopped the
infusion of funds and the subsidiary filed a voluntary bankruptcy
petition. When Gannett presented its claim for advances made to
the subsidiary, the court subordinated the claim to those of other
creditors. The rationale for the court's decision was that the paper
company had been operated for the benefit of Gannett and thus it
never had an opportunity to establish an independent business with
the potential to be profitable.
The distinction between these two cases is elusive indeed. To
be sure, the Court in the Comstock case did find that Mopac acted
in good faith and that its stewardship was on the whole beneficial
to the New Orleans. But this seems equally true of Gannett: accur-
ate records were kept, funds were not commingled, and assets were
not removed from the subsidiary. In fact, after it became clear that
there would be no shortage of newsprint, Gannett poured considera-
ble additional funds into the paper company in an attempt to make
it profitable-even though such expenditures were probably unjus-
tified from an investment standpoint. One is therefore at a loss to
understand what "good faith" means in this context. The Supreme
Court explains its determination of "good faith" as a sort of factual
finding which is largely immunized from review. But as a governing
concept, it seems to lack significance.
While there is no question that Gannett ran the subsidiary with
an eye to its own benefit, it is also relatively clear that Mopac
managed its subsidiaries with a view toward achieving the maxi-
mum profitability of the overall system, and there is no evidence
whatever that Mopac made decisions that would favor the subsidi-
I Id. at 237-51.
31 221 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1955). Herzog and Zweibel regard this case as on the "outermost
periphery" of subordination cases. Herzog & Zweibel, supra note 24, at 111.
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ary at the expense of the Missouri Pacific. The majority in the
Comstock case clearly recognized that the transactions in question
did not benefit the subsidiary and thus they adopted a concept of
"overall benefit" to the subsidiary from its relationship with the
parent to cover their tracks. But, as in the Gannett case, the net
result of all the "beneficial" activities was that the New Orleans
went from solvency to insolvency while under Mopac's control. In-
deed, the Gannett case may even be stronger than Comstock since
the result of Gannett's transactions with the subsidiary was to in-
fuse new cash into the paper company; two of the Missouri Pacific
transactions-the loan used to pay dividends and the debt assump-
tion-had no such effect, and the New Orleans received only the
amorphous benefit of membership in the Mopac system.
One may legitimately ask, therefore, what Gannett did wrong
that Mopac did right. It was certainly rational for Gannett to ac-
quire the newsprint company and certainly rational for it to advance
funds to that company. It was probably irrelevant whether the funds
were placed in the subsidiary in the form of capital or loans. From
Gannett's point of view, it was presumably a matter of indifference
whether the subsidiary was profitable or not since the main purpose
in acquiring it was not to earn income (although that undoubtedly
would have been welcome), but rather to ensure against a shortage
of newsprint. Of course Gannett controlled the subsidiary-the en-
tire transaction would have made no sense if it had not.
It is not clear how the Comstock case differs. From the evidence
it appears that the railroad systems of the New Orleans and its
subsidiaries were intertwined with those of the Missouri Pacific; the
Missouri Pacific advanced funds to subsidiaries of the New Orleans
lacking adequate capital to make necessary improvements; the New
Orleans declared a dividend, desirable for Mopac, but highly ques-
tionable in terms of the New Orleans' own financial condition; and
the New Orleans purchased certain deficit-producing rail lines, un-
related to its existing lines, for the benefit of other parts of the
Missouri Pacific system.
In both Gannett and Comstock, therefore, the parent corpora-
tions acted rationally by seeking to use the subsidiaries to benefit
the entire enterprise. The different results in the two cases may
perhaps be explained by the more heavyhanded nature of Gannett's
use of its subsidiary. The Mopac system possessed a highly complex
corporate structure-the New Orleans was itself a holding company
within that structure. Gannett, on the other hand, evidently pos-
sessed only the one, recently acquired subsidiary. Instead of operat-
ing the newsprint facilities through the subsidiary, Gannett could
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have absorbed them into its own asset pool. If the subsidiary's assets
had been merged into Gannett, Gannett alone would have borne all
the subsidiary's losses. The court may have reasoned that, given the
possibility of this alternative means of securing newsprint "insur-
ance" for the parent's main line of business, it would be unfair for
Gannett's claims to compete in bankruptcy with those of the subsid-
iary's other creditors. In sum, the only explanation for the cases is
that the attempt to benefit the enterprise was more blatant, the
detriments to the subsidiary more apparent, and the outcome more
disastrous. 5
The same ad hoc determination of fairness can be seen in the
legion of cases involving attempts to subordinate or disallow the
claims of a controlling corporation because it "undercapitalized"
the now bankrupt subsidiary. 6 As noted above, 37 the determination
of what constitutes adequate capitalization must be made without
any real guidelines: state corporation statutes do not impose more
than minimum capitalization requirements and the practical im-
portance of capitalization is virtually non-existent where the subsid-
iary can rely on related corporations to infuse new funds when nec-
essary. The amount of funds contributed that the owners wish to
treat as "capital" will depend on many factors, such as tax consider-
ations, the necessity of showing a certain capitalization in order to
qualify for loans, and the risks inherent in the business. On the
whole, the tendency is to keep "capital contributions" to a mini-
mum, both for tax reasons and in order to retain flexibility in future
investment decisions (since money never invested cannot be lost).
Moreover, if the claims of the parents and affiliates are generally
subordinated because of undercapitalization, the only result will be
to add a new consideration to the decision: the amount of debt that,
in light of capital, the bankruptcy court is likely to tolerate without
subordination. The addition of such a consideration is completely
unrelated to an appraisal of the needs of the business, puts a prem-
ium on planning and good guessing, and fails to promote any policy
favored by either the corporate law generally or the Bankruptcy Act
in particular.
As these cases demonstrate, the current approach to subordina-
tion makes little sense in terms of the business considerations that
31 While the New Orleans was reorganized, Gannett's subsidiary had to be liquidated in
straight bankruptcy proceedings.
1' These cases are discussed in detail, without reconciliation, in E. LATTY, SUBSIDIARIES
AND AFFILIATED CORPORATIONS 146-51 (1936). See also Herzog & Zweibel, supra note 24, at 93-
96.
"' See note 9 supra.
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lead to the formation of subsidiaries and affiliates. Control by, and
benefit to, the parent or affiliate and even withdrawal or commin-
gling of assets are entirely natural from a business point of view. The
existing law seems to set up the subsidiary as an entity in a Platonic
world of ideas and assume that it has both a will and raison d'etre
of its own. It follows therefore that each corporation will attempt to
earn a profit for itself, govern itself, and follow an existence distinct
from that of its owners. In reality, a subsidiary or affiliate has no
such existence apart from the enterprise owners, and one would
expect the owners to manipulate all the entities within the enter-
prise to maximize the profit-making potential of the whole.
It is clear from the foregoing that a uniform rule of subordina-
tion or nonsubordination is required in order to reflect the realities
of corporate organization and to do away with the marshalling of
irrelevant factors as aids to decision-making." My preference is for
outright subordination on the ground that all funds placed by a
parent or affiliate in a related firm are based on the expectation of
ultimate profit and are thus by nature distinguishable and distinct
from the claims of creditors who lack an equity interest. 9 But more
important than any particular rule is a penetration of the mists
referred to by Justice Cardozo and an end to meaningless verbal
fencing.
Some authorities have reached 'a result that, in many cases,
will approximate a rule of outright subordination. They have sug-
gested that to differentiate between risk capital that must be sub-
ordinated and a bona fide loan, the court should ask whether, under
the same circumstances, an outside lender would have loaned the
funds on the same terms as the claimant. 0 Almost invariably, the
31 Bayne states flatly that Deep Rock should be abandoned as incapable of "accurate and
intelligent application to facts and circumstances in litigation." Bayne, The Deep Rock
Doctrine Reconsidered II, 19 FORDHAM L. REV. 152, 181 (1951). Rembar approaches this
conclusion, but backs off. Rembar, supra note 24, at 915, 921. Prior to the Deep Rock decision
other commentators expressed the opinion that no middle course seeking to subordinate only
in certain instances would be practical. See Note, Creditors' Rights Upon Insolvency of a
Parent Corporation or Its Instrumentality, 46 HAav. L. REv. 823, 828 (1933); E. LAITr, supra
note 36, at 151-53.
11 While this conclusion is somewhat inconsistent with the Supreme Court cases cited
earlier, supra notes 30 & 34, some courts have apparently reached the same result. See Inter-
national Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. Holton, 247 F.2d 178 (4th Cir. 1957); In re Loewer's Gambrinus
Brewery Co., 167 F.2d 318 (2d Cir. 1948). The Second Circuit explicitly abandoned its path-
making decision in Gambrinus in light of the Comstock case, Judge Frank noting that the
"strict rule" was compelled to yield. Gannett Co. v. Larry, 221 F.2d 269, 275 (2d Cir. 1955).
But see Gilbert v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 399 (2d Cir. 1957) (L. Hand, J., dissenting), where
the court applied the strict test in a tax case.
11 See In re Trimble Co., 479 F.2d 103, 116 (3d Cir. 1973); In re Hugh M. Morris, Trustee
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answer would be negative, indicating subordination. The essence
of such a test is that if a commercial lender would have made the
advance, then it was unnecessary for the parent or affiliate to "in-
vest" its own funds to secure the benefits originally sought in orga-
nizing the subsidiary or affiliate, and therefore the advances may
properly be characterized as true loans. In fact, a parent or affiliate
investing its own funds acts irrationally if it does not consider
whether borrowing from a third party would maximize the return
on funds invested in the entire enterprise. Thus, in most cases in-
volving the subordination issue the stockholders will have "lent"
funds that no commercial lender would have considered advanc-
ing.41 Any test based on an analysis of what the parent would have
done in an arm's length transaction would yield the same results as
one of outright subordination.
B. The Proposed Bankruptcy Act
Section 4-406(a)(2) of the Proposed Bankruptcy Act" directs
subordination of the secured or unsecured claims of an officer, direc-
tor or affiliate of the debtor. Section 1-102(4) defines "affiliate" to
include a person who directly or indirectly controls 20 percent of the
voting power of the debtor, and section 1-102(34) defines "person"
to include a corporation. A corporation is also an "affiliate" when
the same group owns 20 percent or more of the voting power of both
the debtor and the related corporations. Thus, the claims of both
parent corporations and affiliated corporations, as I have used that
term, would be subordinated under the proposed Act.
It can only be assumed that the draftsmen of the Act were
attuned to the sort of considerations outlined above when they made
their recommendation since neither the Commission's Report nor
the notes to its statutory recommendation provide any clue explain-
ing this significant departure from present doctrine.4 3 Such an omis-
sion is particularly surprising in the light of the extensive analytic
comments that accompany many of the other recommended
changes.
of Midland United Co., SEC Holding Co. Act Release No. 5317A, October 25, 1944; Rembar,
supra note 24, at 916; Note, Inadequately Capitalized Subsidiaries, 19 U. CHI. L. REv. 872,
874 (1952).
11 See Small v. Williams, 313 F.2d 39, 42 (4th Cir. 1963) (corporation may have to borrow
from shareholders when it cannot obtain credit from banks); Stuart v. Larson, 298 F. 223,
228 (8th Cir. 1924) (dictum).
,2 The Proposed Bankruptcy Act was introduced first as H.R. 10792, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1973), and then re-introduced as H.R. 31, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
43 REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTcY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES - PART I
214 & n.208 (July 1973); id. - PART II, § 4-406, Note 3.
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One valuable by-product of the Commission's recommenda-
tion, however, will be to still any lingering doubts about the power
of the bankruptcy court to direct subordination. Some years ago,
Professor Hill wrote a much cited, but little followed article in which
he suggested that Erie considerations might apply to the subordi-
nation issue and that claims could therefore only be subordinated
when in furtherance of some federal bankruptcy policy." Professors
Moore and Countryman, in contrast, have seen in the Bankruptcy
Act broad latitude for the bankruptcy court to juggle the equities
of competing claims. 5
The proposed Act resolves this uncertainty by providing ex-
plicit bankruptcy authority for subordination by the bankruptcy
court. This provision would be invalid only if the constitutional
bankruptcy authority was held not to authorize such a provision.
Since not even the most ardent Erie-ists have contended that Con-
gress lacks the authority to legislate on the subordination issue, one
can assume that this issue has been resolved-if, of course, the Act
is adopted with this provision.
III. PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL TO HOLD NONBANKRUPT
CORPORATIONS LIABLE FOR DEBTS OF THEIR BANKRUPT
SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATES
Whether or not the claims of related corporations are subordi-
nated in bankruptcy, the bankrupt's general creditors may attempt
to reach the assets of related companies in order to satisfy their
claims fully. Frequently, such an attempt is complicated by the
need to consider the rights of creditors of the non-bankrupt related
corporation that might be adversely affected by the veil piercing. To
simplify the present discussion, however, it will be assumed that
11 Hill, The Erie Doctrine in Bankruptcy, 66 HARv. L. REV. 1013 (1953).
15 3A W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 63.08, at 1825-26.1 n.1; 65.06 (Moore, 15th ed. 1974);
Countryman, The Use of State Law in Bankruptcy Cases (Part I), 47 N.Y.U.L. REV. 407
(1972). See also Herzog & Zweibel, supra note 24, at 84. Such authority has been found in
one or more of the following sections: § 2a(2) which empowers the bankruptcy court to allow,
disallow, or reconsider claims; § 57d which also gives the court the power to disallow claims;
§ 57k which provides that claims already allowed may be reconsidered and rejected in whole
or in part "according to the equities of the case," implying that the power to disallow the
claims at the beginning of the action on equitable grounds exists a fortiori; and § 2a which
gives the bankruptcy court equitable jurisdiction.
The jurisdiction issue has arisen again with the attempt to subordinate claims based on
unconscionable contracts; the courts that have subordinated such claims have relied on the
status of the federal bankruptcy courts as courts of equity. See In re Elkins-Dell Mfg. Co.,
253 F. Supp. 864 (E.D. Pa. 1966); 67 COLUM. L. REV. 583 (1967). See generally Gordon,
Unconscionability in Bankruptcy: The Federal Contribution to Commercial Decency, 66 Nw.
U.L. REV. 741 (1972).
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such related corporations have sufficient assets to ensure payment
of their own creditors' claims.
A. Source of Authority for Veil Piercing in Bankruptcy
Proceedings
Although several bankruptcy cases have suggested that a par-
ent could be liable for the debts of its subsidiary, the legal basis for
this conclusion has not been carefully explored. In particular, a
trustee's authority under the Bankruptcy Act to attempt to pierce
the veil of the parent on behalf of the bankrupt subsidiary's credi-
tors is unclear. One of the few cases in which the problem was raised
was Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. DuBois." In that case, credi-
tors of two subsidiaries challenged the fairness of a reorganization
plan allowing the stockholders of the parent to participate in a new
company organized to receive all the assets of the parent and sub-
sidiary corporations, and specifically, the failure of the plan to rec-
ognize any liability of the parent to the creditors of the subsidiary.
As an alternative holding,47 Justice Douglas suggested that the
parent could be held liable to creditors of the subsidiaries because
of the enterprise-oriented nature of the operations conducted; by
freely commingling assets and disregarding the formalities of sepa-
rate corporate organization, the parent had, in effect, treated the
subsidiaries "as mere departments of its own business. '4 As author-
ity for the proposition that the assets of the parent may be reached
under these circumstances, Justice Douglas cited a number of cases
in which individual tort and contract creditors had been allowed to
pierce the corporate veil under state or admiralty law.49 He did not,
however, pinpoint the source of the trustee's authority to press the
creditor's claims against the parent in a bankruptcy proceeding.
There are four possible bases for such authority: first, the par-
ent's conduct may give rise to an actionable claim in the subsidiary
312 U.S. 510 (1941).
' Justice Douglas also found that the trustee was empowered by the then § 77B(b) of
the Bankruptcy Act to press claims on behalf of the subsidiaries' creditors against the parent
on the basis of an "operating agreement" among the constituent corporations. The agreement
had vested total control of all the assets of the constituent companies in the parent; under
the agreement the parent had accumulated $5 million in debts to its subsidiaries. If even a
fraction of this claim had been allowed, the equity interests in the parent corporation would
have been completely eliminated under the "absolute priority" doctrine. Under these circum-
stances, the Court held that the fairness of the plan could not be evaluated until the subsidi-
aries' claims had been adjudicated.
312 U.S. at 524.
" This holding ignored the fact that admiralty is not supposed to possess equitable
powers.
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that passes to the subsidiary's trustee pursuant to section 70a(5) of
the Bankruptcy Act;5" second, the authority to pierce the veil may
derive from the general equitable powers of the bankruptcy court;
third, the power may be based on section 70c of the Act 5' which gives
the trustee the status of certain types of creditors; and fourth, the
authority may be a corollary of the requirement that a plan of reorg-
anization be fair and equitable.12 Without extended discussion of
the fourth alternative, it should be noted that there is no indication
in Justice Douglas' opinion that this piercing authority is limited to
reorganization cases; indeed, his citation of nonbankruptcy cases
suggests the contrary. Moreover, the same doctrine has generally
been thought applicable in straight bankruptcy cases.13 Therefore,
it is necessary to look to one of the first three alternatives.
1. Section 70a(5) of the Bankruptcy Act. This section vests the
trustee of a bankrupt company with all of the bankrupt's transfera-
ble or leviable causes of action. Section 70a(5), however, gives the
trustee only those causes of action that belong to the debtor corpora-
tion, not the remedies of a general creditor. Therefore, to reach the
assets of the parent of the bankrupt subsidiary under this section,
the trustee would have to show that the parent had committed a
wrong to its subsidiary in its organization or operation that was
actionable at the instance of the subsidiary itself.
It is difficult to discern any basis for a cause of action arising
from the conduct of the parent vis-A-vis the subsidiary, without
regard to its effect on creditors. Assume, for example, that the sub-
sidiary is undercapitalized. The parent has no corporate law obliga-
tion to adequately capitalize the subsidiary,54 and given the appar-
ent legislative sanction of minimum capitalization, it would be ex-
ceedingly difficult to argue that a common law duty of adequate
capitalization should be imposed. The subsidiary's claim would be
equally questionable if the parent had used its control to destroy the
subsidiary's chances to be profitable. Any claim that did exist would
have to be based on the fiduciary duty of the majority shareholder
toward a minority, rather than on a duty to the corporation as
such.5 Finally, although the commingling of assets and properties
11 U.S.C. § 110(a)(5) (1970).
11 U.S.C. § 110(c) (1970).
52 Bankruptcy Act Ch. X, art. XI, § 221(2), 11 U.S.C. § 621 (1970).
See Long v. McGlon, 263 F. Supp. 96 (D.S.C. 1967); Henderson v. Rounds & Porter
Lumber Co., 99 F. Supp. 376 (W.D. Ark. 1951).
", See note 9 supra.
51 Cf. Lebold v. Inland Steel Co., 125 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 675
(1942); Southern Pac. Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483 (1919); Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh Knitting
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may give rise to a corporate action for an accounting, it is doubtful
that it creates any affirmative obligation beyond that of disentan-
glement. As these examples demonstrate, it is difficult to identify
any right of action that the trustee may inherit from the bankrupt
subsidiary by virtue of section 70a(5).
2. Federal Bankruptcy Law. There appears to be no basis apart
from the specific sections of the Bankruptcy Act to grant the trustee
an affirmative right of action against a parent. Such a piercing of
the veil is sharply distinguishable from the attempt to subordinate
the claim of a controlling shareholder. The general equitable powers
of the bankruptcy court, buttressed by specific statutory provi-
sions,5" provide at least an arguable basis for federal bankruptcy
hegemony over the subordination issue. The power to pierce the
corporate veil, however, involves not the allowance or ranking of
claims, but rather the addition of assets to the bankrupt's estate.
Such an enlargement of the estate on behalf of the bankrupt's credi-
tors cannot be justified on the basis of the court's equitable powers,
since it would conflict with the spirit of the specific property-passing
provisions of section 70a and the provisions of sections 60, 67, and
7057 that give the trustee various rights against the creditors of the
bankrupt.
3. Section 70c. State law undoubtedly authorizes creditors of
a debtor subsidiary to reach the assets of the parent corporation in
certain cases. Section 70c of the Bankruptcy Act accords the trustee
the status of a judgment creditor, execution creditor, and a creditor
holding a lien on the bankrupt's property as of the date of the
bankruptcy. The question is whether the status conferred on the
trustee by section 70c authorizes him to assert an individual credi-
tor's rights under state law to reach the assets of the parent to pay
that creditor's claims.
To analyze the power of the trustee in this regard, it is neces-
sary to recount some ancient history. Prior to the Bankruptcy Act
of 1898,58 insolvency proceedings were the province of the several
states. Commonly, state statutes and/or state equity precedents
authorized the appointment of an insolvency receiver who was
charged with the responsibility of collecting the corporation's assets
and distributing the proceeds to creditors. Three general categories
of property passed to the receiver: first, property in which the debtor
Co., 226 N.Y. 185, 123 N.E. 148 (1919); H. HENN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 240 (1970).
56 See note 45 supra.
5 11 U.S.C. §§ 96, 107, 110 (1970).
Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544-66.
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had some legal or equitable interest; second, causes of action be-
longing to the debtor; and third, certain property which the debtor
was estopped from claiming, such as property fraudulently con-
veyed or illegally paid dividends. Because of his essentially subroga-
tional position, the receiver was not permitted to prosecute rights
of action belonging solely to creditors of the debtor.
The impact of this distinction was felt most strongly in connec-
tion with various statutory rights of action of creditors against the
directors or shareholders of insolvent corporations. Frequently,
there was a right of action if (1) the shareholders had not paid their
complete stock subscriptions; (2) the shareholders had received
stock that had a higher par value than the value of the property or
services contributed or the amount actually paid (watered or
discount stock); (3) the shareholders had received shares without
paying any consideration (bonus shares); (4) the directors paid divi-
dends out of, or otherwise impaired, capital; and (5) shareholders
might be assessed up to the par value of their shares. Many of the
relevant statutory provisions condemned the impairment of capital
without stating what would happen if the corporation took the pro-
hibited action. As might be expected, courts differed on the question
of who might sue for a violation of these provisions and, in particu-
lar, on the question of whether a receiver might bring the action.
Some courts limited the right of action to the creditors of the corpo-
ration, while others extended such a right to the receiver as well.
To some extent, the result seems to have been dictated by the atti-
tude of the particular court toward the purpose of capitalization
requirements. Thus, most courts that viewed capital as a "trust
fund for the benefit of creditors" tended to permit suits by receiv-
ers. 9 On the other hand, most courts adopting the "holding out" or
fraud theory limited the action to specific creditors-even though
there is evidence that they did not actually require individual credi-
tors to prove reliance.'" For our purposes, however, it is important
" See R.H. Herron Co. v. Shaw, 165 Cal. 668,133 P. 488 (1913) (receiver allowed to assert
claim for unpaid stock because the "trustee" cannot release stockholders from their obligation
and therefore the claim remains an asset of the corporation). See also Sawyer v. Hoag, 84
U.S. (17 Wall.) 610 (1873); H. BALLANTINE, supra note 10, § 349, at 805. The receiver stands
in the shoes of the corporation and thus may assert any right belonging to the corporation.
See J. HIGH, RECEIVERS § 315 (4th ed. 1910); 13A W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS, § 6495 (Wolf ed. 1961); 12 id. § 5437 (Wolf. ed. 1971); 3 id. § 1277
(Wolf ed. 1965); 16 id. § 7850 (Wolf ed. 1962).
60 In Hospes v. Northwestern Mfg. & Car Co., 48 Minn. 174, 192, 50 N.W. 1117, 1121
(1892), a much-cited decision rejecting the trust fund theory in favor of the holding out
theory, the court established a rebuttable presumption that all subsequent creditors had
relied on the credit of the corporation. For a criticism of this doctrine see Ballantine,
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to emphasize that, once a court decided that the particular right of
action was "personal" to the creditors, the unanimous result was to
deny the receiver standing to vindicate that right."
The state-created doctrine of "personal" creditor rights, unen-
forceable at the instance of insolvency receivers, was largely re-
tained by the federal courts in interpreting the powers of a trustee
under the Bankruptcy Act, even though the Act was otherwise con-
strued to give trustees powers not enjoyed by state receivers. For
example, section 70a(5) of the 1898 Act gave the trustee title to
property that the bankrupt might have transferred or that might
have been levied upon by his creditors. On its face, this provision
simply clothed the trustee with power equivalent to that of the
insolvency receiver under state law. Yet the Supreme Court inter-
preted the reference to creditors' levies in 70a(5) as giving the trus-
tee rights to any of the bankrupt's property that could have been
reached by the bankrupt's general creditors. 2 Under the literal lan-
guage of 70a(5) or its state law equivalent, such property would not
have passed to the trustee or the state insolvency receiver because
the bankrupt itself might have been estopped to assert title as
against a third party transferee or pledgee."
In 1910, Congress added section 47a(2)," the predecessor of the
strong-arm clause now contained in section 70c of the Act, giving
the trustee a judicial lien on all property coming into the possession
of the bankruptcy court and the status of a judgment creditor hold-
ing an execution returned unsatisfied as to the bankrupt's property
not within the custody of the bankruptcy court. Section 47a(2) thus
expanded the judicial gloss on section 70a(5) by giving the trustee
the rights of a lien and execution creditor, in addition to those of a
general creditor. 5
Stockholders' Liability in Minnesota, 7 MINN. L. REV. 79, 89-92 (1923). On the power of a
receiver to assert creditor rights under a holding out theory, see generally H. BALLANTINE,
supra note 10, § 353 at 814; H. HENN, supra note 55, § 171.
6, See, e.g., Minneapolis Baseball Co. v. City Bank, 66 Minn. 441, 69 N.W. 331 (1896);
Note, Power of Receiver for Corporations to Assert Causes of Action Vested Solely in
Creditors, 46 YALE L.J. 1229 (1937) [hereinafter cited as YALE NoTE]; 39 H~av. L. REv. 768
(1926).
,1 See Knapp v. Milwaukee Trust Co., 216 U.S. 545, 557 (1910); Security Warehous-
ing Co. v. Hand, 206 U.S. 415, 422 (1907). These cases have been criticized on the ground
that § 70a(5) was designed simply to give the trustee title to the bankrupt's property. Coun-
tryman, supra note 45, at 433-437.
'3 Most frequently, trustees used § 70a(5) in this connection to invalidate secret transfers
and pledges that were invalid as to general creditors of the bankrupt for reasons such as lack
of recording and failure to transfer possession.
Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 412, § 8, 36 Stat. 840.
'5 Such an expansion was thought necessary because of the Supreme Court's decision in
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Relying on their expanded powers under section 70a(5) and
47a(2), trustees soon began to pursue corporate directors and stock-
holders for various capital derelictions. The response of the courts
to these attempts was basically twofold. First, the only rights of
action passing to the trustee pursuant to section 70a(5) were those
that belonged to the corporation.66 If, for example, a state statute
or common law rule provided that directors, officers, or stockholders
were personally liable to the corporation itself for the failure to
collect paid-in capital, overvaluation of property contributions,
payment of impairing dividends, or the like, such a right could be
enforced by the corporation." But section 70a(5) did not empower
the trustee to bring such actions on behalf of creditors in cases where
the corporation had no analogous right. Second, when the trustee
was asserting the rights of general creditors under 70a(5), or lien or
execution creditors under 47a(2), it was necessary to identify spe-
cific property of the bankrupt in order to employ these sections to
avoid the interests of third party transferees, mortgagees, and pled-
gees in that property. Thus an undistributed middle-cases involv-
ing rights of action belonging only to creditors but not relating to
specific property-was left outside the coverage of the Bankruptcy
Act.68
This undistributed middle was, of course, equivalent to the pre-
1898 learning denying equity receivers the power to bring actions
"personal" to creditors. In fact, the doctrine was so well entrenched
that the passage of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, the 1910 amend-
ments, and the clarifying amendments of 1950 and 195269 had little
York Mfg. Co. v. Cassell, 201 U.S. 344 (1906), holding that property that could be attacked
by the bankrupt's lien creditors, but not by his general creditors, did not pass to the trustee.
See 45 CONG. REc. 2277 (1910).
11 Although the trustee's power to enforce corporate causes of action pursuant to § 70a(5)
was not specified in that section until 1938, that power had been well recognized prior to the
amendment. See 4A W. COLLIER, supra note 45, T 70.28, at 380; Countryman, supra note 45,
at 466.
17 See Harrigan v. Bergdoll, 270 U.S. 560, 564 (1926); Bayliss v. Rood, 424 F.2d 142,146
(4th Cir. 1970); Gochenour v. Cleveland Terminals Bldg. Co., 118 F.2d 89, 93 (6th Cir. 1941);
In re Remington Auto & Motor Co., 153 F. 845, 347 (2d Cir. 1907); Babbitt v. Read, 215 F.
395, 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1914), aff'd, 236 F. 42 (2d Cir. 1916), cert. denied, 243 U.S. 648 (1917);
Falco v. Kaupisch Creamery Co., 42 Ore. 422, 70 P. 286 (1903); Irving Trust Co. v. Gunder,
234 App. Div. 252, 254 N.Y.S. 630 (1932); 4A W. COLLIER, supra note 45, 70.29[2], [3].
" See In re Associated Oil Co., 289 F. 693 (6th Cir. 1923); Seegmiller v. Day, 249 F. 177
(7th Cir. 1918); In re Jassoy Co., 178 F. 515 (2d Cir. 1910); In re Huffman-Salver Roofing Paint
Co., 234 F. 798 (N.D. Ala. 1916); State Bank of Commerce v. Kenney Band Instrument Co.,
143 Minn. 236, 173 N.W. 560 (1919) (dictum); Hicklin v. Cummings, 211 Iowa 687, 234 N.W.
530 (1931). See generally 4A W. COLLIER, supra note 45, 70.29[2], [3].
11 The provisions of § 47a(2) were shifted to § 70c in 1938, Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575,
§ 70, 52 Stat. 881. The amendment of 1950, Act of March 18, 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-461, 64
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or no discernible effect. 70 No court viewed these legislative develop-
ments as an opportunity to reevaluate the old learning, and none
focused on the question of whether the outcome was rational in
terms of the trustee's role under the Act and the other powers con-
ferred on him by the Act. 71
Since the bankruptcy court's view of the trustee's power vis-d-
vis the personal rights of creditors was largely dictated by the learn-
ing developed in state insolvency proceedings prior to 1898, it seems
reasonable to ask why the state courts so uniformly denied insol-
vency receivers the power to vindicate these personal creditor rights.
There certainly was no objection to permitting the receiver to exer-
cise the rights of creditors because the debtor itself might have been
estopped from pursuing the action; state courts readily permitted
receivers to trace fraudulently conveyed property and illegally paid
dividends into the hands of transferees regardless of the debtor's
right to recover the property.72 In some instances, the explanation
may lie in the fact that, under the "holding out" theory, creditors
could bring actions based on capital derelictions only if they had
relied on the balance sheet and therefore on the apparent capital of
the corporation. Since only certain creditors had this right to recov-
ery, it is understandable that the receiver was not permitted to
enforce the cause of action on behalf of all creditors.73 Where, how-
Stat. 2, changed the status of the trustee, giving him the rights of a lien creditor on all
property of the debtor whether or not in the control of the court. The 1952 amendments
clarified the language of the section, Act of October 7, 1952, ch. 579, 66 Stat. 430. While the
number of cases involving the question of the trustee's power to assert "personal" creditor
rights became rather sparse, the few that were reported continued to view these rights of
action as not passing to the bankruptcy trustee. See In re Petroleum Corp. of America, 417
F.2d 929, 934 & n.ll (8th Cir. 1969); Fitzgerald v. Marshall, 161 F. Supp. 470 (D. Colo. 1958).
70 See, e.g., Courtney v. Georger, 228 F. 859 (2d Cir. 1915), cert. denied, 241 U.S. 660
(1916); In re Jassoy Co., 178 F. 515 (2d Cir. 1910); Courtney v. Croxton, 239 F. 247 (6th Cir.
1917); cf. Smalley v. Bernstein, 165 La. 1, 18, 115 So. 347, 352 (1927), cert. denied, 277 U.S.
599 (1928) (citing no authority). See Morris v. Sampsel, 224 Wis. 560, 272 N.W. 53 (1937),
cert. denied, 305 U.S. 608 (1938); In re Huffman-Salvar Roofing Paint Co., 234 F. 798, 803
(N.D. Ala. 1916).
1' A few decisions disagreed with the general trend of authority and held that § 47a(2)
empowered the trustee to enforce causes of action belonging to creditors. These opinions,
however, neither analyzed the older cases, nor focused on the legislative history of § 47a(2),
nor distinguished the substantial number of holdings to the contrary. See In re Dalton Elec.
Co., 7 F. Supp. 465, 468 (S.D. Miss. 1934); (alternative holding); Grand Rapids Trust Co. v.
Nichols, 199 Mich. 126, 165 N.W. 667 (1917); Bernard v. Carr, 167 N.C. 481, 83 S.E. 816
(1914).
11 See Mackall v. Pocock, 136 Minn. 8, 161 N.W. 228 (1917); Minneapolis Baseball Co.
v. City Bank, 66 Minn. 441, 443, 69 N.W. 331, 333 (1896) (dictum); Minnesota Thresher Mfg.
Co. v. Langdon, 44 Minn. 37, 46 N.W. 310 (1890); Rubenstein v. Berch, 261 App. Div. 265,
25 N.Y.S. 2d 202 (1941); YALE NoTE, supra note 61, at 1230-31 (reviewing authorities).
11 See Seegmiller v. Day, 249 F. 177, 181 (7th Cir. 1918); Courtney v. Croxton, 239 F.
247, 250 (6th Cir. 1917).
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ever, the substantive law did not require reliance-as in an action
to impose shareholder liability in a "trust fund" jurisdiction-
another explanation is required.
The most plausible explanation for these cases is that the state
courts were attempting to protect the basic principle of limited
liability for corporate shareholders against an open-ended attack by
insolvency receivers. In an action to recover property fraudulently
conveyed or dividends illegally paid, it is not harsh to hold the
stockholder liable because his liability is limited to property or
funds received gratuitously which appear to have unjustly enriched
the stockholder at the expense of the corporation's creditors. But
when shareholders who received shares they thought to be fully paid
up are asked for additional funds, and a fortiori, when they are
assessed for the full par value of their shares by virtue of a statutory
provision, they are being asked to pay a liability that (1) was
unanticipated; (2) was not bargained for, and indeed that the corpo-
ration would be estopped from enforcing; and (3) was far out of
proportion to any benefits they received in obtaining the stock. 4
Such actions undermine the essential premise of limited liability-
that a stockholder's risk is limited to his original investment. In
denying the receiver the power to enforce creditors' rights in this
area and thus limiting relief to those creditors who are willing to
bring suit, courts may be attempting to maximize protection for
shareholders in accordance with the principle of limited liability.75
In 1966, there was a dramatic change in the Bankruptcy Act 76
that could be the basis for a reassessment of the logic behind a
limitation of the trustee's power. Two subsections were added to
section 70c giving the trustee new hypothetical statuses: subsection
70c(1) made the trustee a judgment creditor, and subsection 70c(2)
made the trustee a creditor with an execution returned unsatisfied.77
71 See Seegmiller v. Day, 249 F. 177 (7th Cir. 1918) (trustee can recover dividends paid
from capital from stockholder recipients, but not from directors who assented to payment);
Hilliard v. Lyman, 138 F. 469, 470 (D. Vt. 1905) (again, protecting directors, the court noting
that "[tihere is no limit to liability upwards"). When the creditors sue, they are limited to
the amount of their deficiency from the estate of the bankrupt; the receiver, when he is
allowed standing to sue, is not so limited. 16 W. FLETCHER, supra note 59, §§ 7847, 7848. A
recent example of a court trying to protect such persons from the strong arm of the trustee is
In re Petroleum Corp. of America, 417 F.2d 919, 935 (8th Cir. 1969). This notion finds some
support in the variety of defenses available to shareholders when sued by creditors. See
generally Bonbright, Shareholders Defenses Against Liability to Creditors on Watered Stock,
25 COLUM. L. REv. 408 (1925).
71 See In re Associated Oil Co., 289 F. 693, 697 (6th Cir. 1923); Seegmiller v. Day, 249 F.
177, 180-81 (7th Cir. 1918); In re Crystal Spring Bottling Co., 96 F. 945, 946 (D. Vt. 1899).
7e Act of July 5, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-495, 80 Stat. 269.
" The trustee's status as a lien creditor on the property of the bankrupt was also moved
to subsection 3 of section 70c.
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Unlike the former section which gave the trustee a lien on the prop-
erty of the bankrupt, these subsections do not purport to give the
trustee a specific interest in such property; indeed, subsection
70c(2), which gives the trustee the status of a creditor with an unsa-
tisfied execution, contradicts the notion that the trustee has an
interest in specific property or in any property at all. Under these
new provisions, the trustee's interest arises solely by virtue of his
status as a creditor. It would be permissible to infer that, by these
new provisions, Congress closed the existing gap that prevented
trustees from using creditors' rights and remedies that were not
fastened on specific property of the bankrupt, and overruled a con-
siderable amount of the old learning in the process.
The major obstacle to such an inference is the lack of evidence
in the legislative history that such a sweeping change was ever con-
templated. The stated reason for the addition of subsection 70c(1),
giving the trustee the status of a judgment creditor, was to clarify
the trustee's power to avoid certain unrecorded tax liens; the stated
reason for the addition of subsection 70c(2), giving the trustee the
status of a creditor with execution returned unsatisfied, was to en-
able the trustee to invoke supplementary remedies under state law,
such as for the return of property fraudulently conveyed, on behalf
of creditors whose judgments were unsatisfied. 8 There is no hint in
the legislative history, nor in the contemporaneous commentary by
a number of leading bankruptcy experts who participated in the
drafting of the legislation, that the amendments were also intended
to reverse the longstanding rule that personal rights of creditors
against third parties do not pass to the trustee.7 9
Despite the lack of supporting legislative history, a strong argu-
ment can be made that the radical alteration in the language of 70c
should permit a construction that would eliminate the old learning
on creditors' personal rights. First, the maintenance of the old rule
is an anomaly in the context of the broad powers of trustees under
the Bankruptcy Act. In addition to giving the property of the bank-
rupt plus the rights of existing creditors to the trustee, sections 60,
67a, and 70c grant him the power to avoid transfers that no creditor
can avoid and sections 67d and 70e give him the power to avoid
certain liens and transfers in toto, not limited to the amount of the
See H.R. REP. No. 686, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
See Kennedy, The Bankruptcy Amendments of 1966, 1 GA. L. REV. 149, 166-71 (1967);
Marsh, Triumph or Tragedy? The Bankruptcy Act Amendments of 1966, 42 WASH. L. REV.
681 (1967). The effect of the 1966 amendments was left open in In re Petroleum Corp. of
America, 417 F.2d 929, 935 & n.12 (8th Cir. 1969).
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claim of the creditor whose rights the trustee is asserting. Second,
there is no intelligent policy reason for maintaining the anomaly of
denying certain creditors' powers to the trustee."0 If this denial of the
trustee's power is, as suggested above, ultimately based on a desire
to preserve the principle of limited liability or, perhaps, on a feeling
of sympathy for beleagured directors, a better remedy would be to
alter the state substantive provisions that grant the creditors such
far-reaching rights. Recent developments in the class action area
suggest that the protection afforded shareholders and directors by
the rule against trustee enforcement may be severely curtailed in
any case by the opportunity under present law for creditors to sue
as a class to vindicate their individual rights on a collective basis.81
Third, since creditors of the bankrupt look to the trustee to repre-
sent them in collecting and pursuing claims, they would probably
be quite surprised to learn that there is a class of cases in which they
must initiate either individual or collective action in order to vindi-
cate their rights.
The importance of this question for our purposes is not, how-
ever, to show that the bankruptcy trustee should be able to pursue
shareholders and/or directors for improper dividends or the issuance
of discount, watered, or bonus shares. Rather this discussion is an
attempt to find an authoritative basis for piercing the corporate veil
at the instance of the bankruptcy triustee. Section 70c should be
adequate for this purpose.8 2 However, a caveat is in order: even if
the trustee is granted standing to press the claims of creditors
against a parent corporation, the success of that venture will still
depend on the substantive provisions of the governing state law. 3
" See State Bank of Commerce v. Kenney Band Instrument Co., 143 Minn. 236, 240,
173 N.W. 560, 562 (1919) (dictum); YALE NOTE, supra note 61, at 1234-35; H. BALLANTINE,
supra note 9, at 782-83, 814-16. The authors of the Collier treatise seem to lean in this
direction, although it is hard to tell. 4A W. COLLIER, supra note 45, 70.29[3], at 435 &
nn.41-42.
11 FED. R. Civ. P. 23 should faciliate class actions on behalf of creditors. While some
class actions in the past were successful, see State Bank of Commerce v. Kenney Band
Instrument Co., 143 Minn. 236, 173 N.W. 560 (1919), there were many defects under the older
procedures, see YALE NOTE, supra note 61, at 1234.
82 In Long v. McGlon, 263 F. Supp. 96 (D.S.C. 1967), the court relied on the amended
version of section 70c to find that the trustee had such power, but did not indicate that the
result would have been different under the earlier version. But cf. In re Petroleum Corp. of
America, 417 F.2d 929, 934 (8th Cir. 1969), stating that trustee's rights under old 70c relate
only to "property in which the bankrupt has some interest or as to which the bankrupt might
be the ostensible owner"; the court did not consider the effect of the 1966 amendments. The
district court pierced the veil in Eubanks v. Allstate Ins. Co., 441 F.2d 7 (5th Cir. 1971), but
the basis of that decision was unclear and the Fifth Circuit affirmed on alternative grounds.
0 The use of state law is implicit in the court's opinion in Long v. McGlon, 263 F. Supp.
96, 98 (D.S.C. 1967), the only judicial authority on the question. The Proposed Bankruptcy
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B. An Analysis of Veil Piercing in the Bankruptcy of a
Constituent Corporation
State courts have never been called upon to decide whether a
trustee may pierce the corporate veil in order to augment a bank-
rupt's estate for the benefit of the bankrupt's creditors. They are
quite familiar, however, with attempts by single creditors to pierce
the veil in order to collect an individual debt. Therefore, to analyze
the probable attitude of the states toward the former situation it is
necessary to examine first the doctrine of limited liability and the
circumstances under which state courts have overridden it at the
instance of a single creditor to reach the assets of the stockholders,
and then the logical application of this learning to bankruptcy
cases. Before pursuing these lines of inquiry, it should be noted that
piercing the veil is substantially different in a bankruptcy context
than at the behest of a single creditor: in bankruptcy the parent's
liability is potentially much greater since it extends to all of the
corporation's creditors. 4
1. The Policy of Limited Liability. The origins of the doctrine
of limited liability are obscure. The available evidence suggests that
it was originally designed to facilitate the organization of businesses
requiring more capital than was available from one or a small num-
ber of individuals. Limited liability may have been thought neces-
sary to stimulate capital investment by assuring investors that their
risk would be limited to their investment; such an assurance would
have been especially welcome if the enterprise were to be managed
by others.5 Another possible explanation is that manufacturers and
other mercantile enterprises had simply gained sufficient political
clout to obtain limited liability for their owners, without reference
Act would clearly authorize trustees to prosecute actions on behalf of classes of creditors. See
BANKRUPTCY COMMISSION REPORT-H, supra note 43, § 4-604(b)(2). However, it appears that
the major purpose of that provision was to overrule Caplin v. Marine Midland Grace Trust
Co., 406 U.S. 416 (1972), which denied a reorganization trustee the standing to assert claims
of misconduct by an indenture trustee on behalf of one group of bondholders. In contrast,
restrictions on trustees' actions against shareholders and directors appear tied in with the
underlying rights themselves, and it is questionable whether the proposed Act will alter the
governing doctrine as discussed earlier. See BANKRUPTcy COMISSIoN REPORT-Il, supra note 43,
§ 4-604, note at T 6.
1' It should also be noted that the trustee will represent the claims of not only "widows
and orphans" but also of creditors who could clearly be expected to look out for themselves.
I See Dodd, The Evolution of Limited Liability in American Industry: Massachusetts,
61 HARv. L. REV. 1351 (1948). There has been some suggestion that the fact of limited liability
was less important than other benefits of corporate organization. See T. VEBLEN, ABSENTEE
OWNERSHIP ch. V (1923); Douglas & Shanks, Insulation from Liability Through Subsidiary
Corporations, 39 YALE L.J. 193 (1929). See also Dix, Adequate Risk Capital: The Considera-
tion for the Benefits of Separate Incorporation, 53 Nw. U.L. REV. 478 (1958).
1975]
The University of Chicago Law Review
to its necessity as a stimulus to business organization. 6 In any
event, it is relatively clear that the doctrine of limited liability was
envisioned as a protection for individuals who invested in business
enterprises. Insofar as the corporation itself could not pay its debts,
society at large was to bear the costs of the corporate enterprise.
Since state corporation statutes did not contain capitalization re-
quirements or other devices providing some initial protection for
creditors, this societal subsidization could prove quite extensive.
Yet the original conception of the operative role of limited lia-
bility was quite narrow. There is considerable evidence that the
corporation originated as an attempt to organize individuals into a
collective body that could act on its own, without regard to all the
constituent individuals.8 7 When corporation law was in its formative
stages, corporations were of substantial size and were owned by a
group of individual stockholders. The one-man or close corporation
was a rarity, if it existed at all.8 Thus it is doubtful that those who
drafted and approved the first corporation statutes contemplated
extending limited liability to the "one-man" corporation. In fact, it
was not until 1897 that the House of Lords, in the famous Salomon
case, made it clear that a single proprietor could incorporate his
business to achieve limited liability. 89
Similarly, it is unlikely that the draftsmen of the early corpora-
tion statutes intended to permit an additional layer of limited liabil-
ity for part of a business enterprise through the formation of subsidi-
ary corporations. As a general rule, corporation statutes severely
limited permissible corporate activities and did not permit one cor-
poration to own stock in another. While the concept of limited lia-
bility was relatively fixed in America by 1830,1o Professor Robinson's
study of the early formation of holding companies indicates that it
was not until 1832 that the first corporation was given authority to
hold stock in another corporation, and, until the last years of the
nineteenth century, such stock holdings were extremely rare.', Be-
" The late Professor Dodd's study of the origin of the doctrine of limited liability in
Massachusetts suggests that its original beneficiaries were largely manufacturing or utility
enterprises of fairly substantial means. Dodd, supra note 85, at 1373.
"I See A. BERLE, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF CORPORATE FINANCE 1-25 (1928). See generally
H. TAYLOR, LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS chs. 1-2 (5th ed. 1902).
88 See Cataldo, supra note 1, at 474-75 ("It is most doubtful whether the concept of
corporate enterprise was ever intended or designed to embrace [the one man company]");
Fuller, supra note 9, at 1374 & n.4; I. WORMSER, FRANKENSTEIN, INCORPORATED 93-100 (1931);
Note, Judicial Supervision of the One Man Corporation, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1084, 1089 (1932).
Salomon v. A. Salomon & Co., Ltd., [1897] A.C. 22.
" See Dodd, supra note 85, at 1371.
Robinson, The Holding Corporation-i, 18 YALE REV. 390, 400-07 (1910); 2 A. DEWING,
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yond this time differential between the development of the concept
of limited liability and the growth of the parent-subsidiary form of
organization, it appears that the original pressure to permit corpora-
tions to hold stock in others was not motivated by a desire to obtain
limited liability. Rather, large corporations desired this power to
expand their empires through the device of stock ownership in other
companies, generally competitors.9 2
The historical background indicates that limited liability was
never intended to protect a parent corporation against liability for
the debts of its subsidiary. More importantly, the policies justifying
limited liability do not require a contrary result: only the entity
responsible for the management of the subsidiary (the parent) will
be held liable, and therefore a larger group of shareholders will not
be held directly responsible for behavior over which they retain only
theoretical control. Moreover, no individual stockholder is subjected
to risks greater than his original investment.
If limited liability were being considered for the first time, a
strong argument could be made that it should not be extended to
the -corporate parent vis-A-vis its subsidiary. At the present time,
however, the principle of limited liability appears to be so ensconced
as to preclude such a broad-scale attack. Thus, taking the doctrine
of limited liability as given, the problem is to identify the situations
in which it should be inapplicable, remembering, of course, that the
bankruptcy court will be looking to state law to guide the determi-
nation.
2. Piercing the Veil at the Instance of a Single Creditor. Al-
though the literature of veil piercing is gargantuan, most of it simply
supra note 1, at 968-69; H. TAYLOR, supra note 87, § 130 n.6; Enterprise Entity, supra note
29, at 344. In 1889, the Illinois Supreme Court declared that a corporation could not, as one
of its incidental powers, hold stock in other corporations. People ex rel. Peabody v. Chicago
Gas Trust Co., 130 Ill. 268, 22 N.E. 798 (1889). But see Booth v. Robinson, 55 Md. 419, 433-
34 (1881). It was not until 1889 that New Jersey amended its corporation statute to authorize
corporations to hold stock in other corporations; prior to that time, corporations seeking to
hold stock in other corporations had to obtain special and individual permission from the
legislature. By 1910, only thirteen states had passed statutes definitely authorizing corpora-
tions to hold stock in other companies. Robinson, The Holding Corporation-II, 19 YALE REV.
13, 29 (1910). See also Douglas & Shanks, supra note 85, at 194 n.6.
11 Since it was frequently not feasible to obtain the assests of competitors directly, the
purchase of stock was a necessary mechanism to the same end. Douglas & Shanks, supra note
85, at 193; Robinson, supra note 91, 18 YAE REv. at 400-07. The Supreme Court probably
hastened the use of the parent-subsidiary form by appearing to forbid the organization of
industrial enterprises by means of a trust, but permitting a similar development by formation
of holding companies. United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895). The possibility
of avoiding the antitrust laws by means of holding companies was foreclosed, however, by
Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
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describes the various factual patterns that support piercing.93 De-
void of any consistent doctrinal basis, the cases themselves defy any
attempt at rational explanation.94 This confusion has apparently
been produced by a failure to identify what is at stake in a veil
piercing case: the very principle of limited liability for the share-
holders. As a result, the typical veil piercing case is an exercise in
cataloging a number of factors in order to reach a normative conclu-
sion that piercing is or is not appropriate.95
Since state corporation laws allow limited liability without any
exceptions, the question may well be asked why veil piercing should
be permitted in any case. It could be argued that the legislature's
clear intention to be generous in according this privilege is evi-
denced by the minimal requirements for setting up a corporation.9"
Unless there were an invalid incorporation or some basis for an
estoppel, limited liability would be an iron-clad rule.
Although the origins of the doctrine of veil piercing are obscure,
a literal application of the principle of limited liability has not been
adhered to by the courts. Virtually all courts have demonstrated a
willingness to depart from limited liability under some circumstan-
ces; the problem is essentially one of defining the appropriate cir-
cumstances.97 If one could hypothesize the legislative intent in this
11 The Great Depression was responsible for a substantial amount of learning on the
subject. See, e.g., E. LArT, supra note 36; Horowitz, Disregarding the Entity of Private
Corporations(pts. 1-2), 14 WASH. L. REv. 285, 15 WASH. L. REv. 1 (1939-1940). Apart from this
present effort, the past two decades have been largely spent in digesting the prior learning;
perhaps the present economic travails will encourage a resurgence of interest. See also 2 G.
HORNSTEIN, CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 751-59 (1959 and Supp. 1968).
11 A good example is the sharp split of authority regarding the liability of a parent
corporation on the lease assumed by a subsidiary established to sublet premises used in the
parent's business. Compare Darling Stores Corp. v. Young Realty Co., 121 F,2d 112 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 314 U.S. 658 (1941); Consolidated Sun Ray, Inc. v. Oppenstein, 335 F.2d 801
(8th Cir. 1964), and Weisser v. Mursam Shoe Corp., 127 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1942), with Majestic
Co. v. Orpheum Circuit, 21 F.2d 720 (8th Cir. 1927) and North v. Higbee Co., 131 Ohio St.
507, 3 N.E.2d 391 (1936). The commentators disagree about the existence of applicable stan-
dards. See E. LATY, supra note 36, at 191, who contends that the formula comes down to:
"liability is imposed to reach an equitable result"; Ballantine, Separate Entity of Parent and
Subsidiary Corporations, 14 CALF. L. REV. 12, 15 (1925): "Unfortunately it does not seem to
be possible to lay down any definite test as to when the usual immunity of the stockholder
should be disregarded, but the courts assign various grounds which to a great extent are vague
and illusory"; Note, Disregarding Separate Corporate Entities to Preserve an Integrated
Economic Structure, 47 COLUM. L. Rav. 109, 111 & n.13 (1947) (reviewing authorities).
11 See, e.g., National Bond Fin. Co. v. General Motors Corp., 238 F. Supp. 248 (W.D.
Mo. 1964), afl'd, 341 F.2d 1022 (8th Cir. 1965).
11 See note 9 supra.
97 See, e.g., Consolidated Sun Ray, Inc. v. Oppenstein, 355 F.2d 801, 806 (8th Cir. 1964);
Steven v. Roscoe Turner Aeronautical Corp., 324 F.2d 157 (7th Cir. 1963); Fisser v. Interna-
tional Bank, 282 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1960).
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area, it would probably be to permit separate incorporation, with its
attendant privilege of limited liability, in the following circumstan-
ces: first, to encourage an existing business to expand into a new
field by limiting its risk in doing so; second, to permit the insulation
of parts of a business enterprise from the risks of other parts in
circumstances where the separate parts might exist as separate
businesses; and third, to satisfy various legal or administrative re-
quirements. On the other hand, it it doubtful that the legislature
intended to bestow the privilege of limited liability on attempts to
divide one business into a number of mutually dependent units or
to divide the business so that all the assets were in one company and
all the liabilities were in another.
This hypothesis assumes that there is a model of corporateness
inherent in the legislative grant of corporate personality, a signifi-
cant departure from which would cause the loss of that aspect of
corporateness known as limited liability. The model for corporate-
ness requires both economic viability and the observance of certain
procedural formalities. While this proposed test is not precise or
capable of quantification, it is possible to reconcile most of the
piercing cases by reference to its criteria.
A number of considerations are useful in determining whether
or not a subsidiary is operated as a viable business, with the proper
observance of the procedural formalities of separate corporateness.
First, and probably foremost, the subsidiary must have an adequate
capitalization to carry out its intended business." As already
noted,1 0 this requirement is not found in the corporation statutes;
rather, it must be based on the assumption that the legislative
policy contemplated more than nominal capitalization, but de-
clined to specify precise amounts because the figures would vary
in relation to the nature and size of the business. Second, the enter-
prise must be organized and managed to ensure that the subsidiary
has a realistic potential for profitability. If the subsidiary is com-
pelled by unfavorable long-term contracts to sell goods at an unjus-
See Enterprise Entity, supra note 29; cf. Rembar, supra note 24, at 915.
See G.E.J. Corp. v. Uranium Aire, Inc., 311 F.2d 749 (9th Cir. 1962); Luckenback S.S.
Co. v. W. R. Grace & Co., 267 F. 676 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 254 U.S. 644 (1920); American
Trading & Production Corp. v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 412 (N.D. Ill. 1970);
Portsmouth Cotton Oil Ref. Corp. v. Fourth Nat'l Bank, 280 F. 879 (M.D. Ala.), afl'd, 284
F. 718 (5th Cir. 1922); Cataldo, supra note 1, at 495-96; Douglas & Shanks, supra note 85, at
214; Note, Liability of a Corporation for Acts of a Subsidiary or Affiliate, 71 HARV. L. REV.
1122, 1128-30 (1958) [hereinafter cited as HARVARD NOTE]. If a corporation is adequately
capitalized at its inception but loses money in its normal operations, then the veil will not
be pierced because the stockholder (parent) has paid the "price" for limited liability. See id.
at 1129.
'" See note 9 supra.
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tifiably low price, if it is obliged to make excessive rental or interest
payments to the parent, or if its profits are regularly drained off in
improvident dividends, this requirement will not be satisfied.,1"
Third, the subsidiary must not be excessively dependent on the
parent. For example, if the subsidiary's sole function were to act as
a marketing agent or supplier for the parent, a court might be
inclined to pierce the veil, 02 especially if investors would be unlikely
to organize an independent, nonsubsidiary corporation that would
engage in the same business. Similarly, when the parent pays most
of the subsidiary's bills because the subsidiary's operating funds are
insufficient, courts may well conclude that the subsidiary is overly
dependent.' 3 Fourth, the parent must treat its subsidiary as a sepa-
rate entity. Thus, corporate formalities must be observed, assets
and properties may not be commingled,'"4 and the public image of
the subsidiary as a separate corporation must be preserved.0 5 The
rationale for giving weight to procedural observances is essentially
one of estoppel; the parent should not be permitted to hold the
subsidiary out to the world as an integral part of its operation and
then call foul when a creditor attempts to hold it liable for the
subsidiary's debts. 00
"I See Joseph R. Foard Co. v. Maryland, 219 F. 827 (4th Cir. 1914) (subsidiary was forced
to pay parent management fee equal to net earnings); Henderson v. Rounds & Porter Lumber
Co., 99 F. Supp. 376 (W.D. Ark. 1951) (contract with parent required sale of lumber substan-
tially below market price and at loss to subsidiary); Erickson v. Minnesota & Ontario Power
Co., 134 Minn. 209, 158 N.W. 979 (1916); Wallace v. Tulsa Yellow Cab Taxi & Baggage Co.,
178 Okla. 15, 61 P.2d 645 (1936). But see Bartle v. Home Owners Coop. Inc., 309 N.Y. 103,
127 N.E. 832 (1955) (subsidiary could not earn profit, yet veil was not pierced because the
majority failed to see any fraud, misrepresentation, or illegality in the incorporation or
operation of the subsidiary).
"Iz See Commerce Trust Co. v. Woodbury, 77 F.2d 478 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S.
614 (1935); Hamilton Ridge Lumber Sales Corp. v.. Wilson, 25 F.2d 592 (4th Cir. 1928);
Henderson v. Rounds & Porter Lumber Co., 99 F. Supp. 376 (W.D. Ark. 1951).
"I See Consolidated Sun Ray, Inc. v. Oppenstein, 335 F.2d 801 (8th Cir. 1964); Joseph
R. Foard Co. v. Maryland, 219 F. 827 (4th Cir. 1914).
,oS See Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510 (1941); Consolidated Sun
Ray, Inc. v. Oppenstein, 325 F.2d 801, 805 (8th Cir. 1964); Darling Stores Corp. v. Young
Realty Co., 121 F.2d 112 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 658 (1941); Joseph R. Foard Co. v.
Maryland, 219 F. 827 (4th Cir. 1914); Ross v. Pennsylvania Ry., 106 N.J.L. 536, 148 A. 741
(1930); cf. Francis 0. Day Co. v. Shapiro, 267 F.2d 669 (D.C. Cir. 1959). But see Bergenthal
v. State Garage & Trucking Co., 179 Wis. 42, 190 N.W. 901 (1922) (court refused to pierce
veil even though the businesses were operated out of the same office and plaintiff had not
specified which she wished to deal with).
" See Steven v. Roscoe Turner Aeronautical Corp., 324 F.2d 157 (7th Cir. 1963); Kings-
ton Dry Dock Co. v. Lake Champlain Transp. Co., 31 F.2d 265, 267 (2d Cir. 1929); American
Trading & Production Corp. v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 412 (N.D. Ill. 1970);
Douglas & Shanks, supra note 85, at 197.
"I8 See Sisco-Hamilton Co. v. Lennon, 240 F.2d 68, 69 (7th Cir. 1957) ("the parent
corporation cannot sit back on its charter and avoid tort responsibility for its delinquent
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Two other factors, while not technically applicable to this
viability-procedural observance analysis, are sometimes relevant.
First, while the doctrine would theoretically call for piercing regard-
less of whether the stockholder were an individual or a controlling
corporation, courts may have a greater proclivity to reach corporate,
as opposed to individual, stockholders."°7 This apparent discrepancy
in treatment may be explained by the origin of the corporate form
of organization as a protection against unlimited personal liability:
since disregard of the corporate fiction in the context of related
corporations does not involve additional liability for the individual
stockholder, the basic policy behind limited liability remains undis-
turbed.
Second, while the doctrine should apply equally to tort and
contract cases, some commentators have also observed a greater
reluctance on the part of the courts to pierce the veil in contract
cases."0 8 This reluctance undoubtedly stems from the view that con-
tract creditors are better able to protect themselves by investigating
the subsidiary before they engage in business with it. While such an
expectation may be unrealistic in the many situations where a full
credit investigation would not be economically feasible, there can
be little doubt that many contract creditors are able to protect
themselves. Under these circumstances, it is not unreasonable for
the courts to estop creditors from denying the existence of the very
entity with which they have been dealing."' 9
The foregoing analysis of the viability-procedural observance
test may well appear to contradict the argument made in an earlier
section that doctrines based on the independent entity status of
constituent corporations are necessarily fictional. To recapitulate
child"); Coston v. Manila Elec. Co., 24 F.2d 383 (2d Cir. 1928); Stark Elec. Ry. v. McGinty
Contracting Co., 238 F. 657, 661-63 (6th Cir. 1917); HARVARD NOTE, supra note 99, at 1125,
1130.
"I See Zubik v. Zubik, 384 F.2d 267, 273 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 988 (1968);
Walkovszky v. Carlton, 18 N.Y.2d 414, 223 N.E.2d 6, 276 N.Y.S.2d 585 (1966); E. LATrY,
supra note 36, at 192-201 (1966); Rembar, supra note 24, at 908-09.
' See Rembar, supra note 24, at 911; E. LArry, supra note 36, at 201-05; Cataldo, supra
note 1, at 475-78; HARVARD NOTE, supra note 99, at 1129 & n.58; cf. Saloman v. A. Salomon
& Co., [1897] A.C. 22, 44-46.
I" See Fisser v. International Bank, 282 F.2d 231, 239 (2d Cir. 1960), holding that the
veil should not be pierced where creditor had full information about status of subsidiary; New
York Trust Co. v. Carpenter, 250 F. 668, 673, 678 (6th Cir. 1918); North v. Highee Co., 131
Ohio St. 507, 3 N.E.2d 391 (1936) (no reliance by certificate holders); cf. Weisser v. Mursam
Shoe Corp., 127 F. 2d 344 (2d Cir. 1942) (holding contract creditor raised triable issue of fact
by alleging he was misled into not making appropriate inquiries). See also Zubik v. Zubik,
384 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 988 (1968), denying recovery against sole
stockholder to a tort creditor who knew of the subsidiary's dependence.
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that argument: it is inherent in the parent-subsidiary structure that
the owners of the enterprise will have little or no concern with the
independent profitability of the constituent corporations of their
enterprise, as distinct from the overall enterprise. Thus control,
capitalization, inter-corporate financial transactions, separate prof-
itability, and similar factors are doomed to failure as effective tests.
The doctrine of limited liability, on the other hand, assumes that
the subsidiary will have an independent drive to profitability. Be-
cause this assumption does not accord with reality, ' there is always
something vaguely metaphysical"' about the factors suggested by
the viability-procedural observance approach, factors that would
not be considered by an investor seeking to maximize the return on
his overall investment. Something of this view seems to lurk in
Judge Learned Hand's statement that in veil piercing actions, the
courts must rely on an observance of "the form [rather] than ....
the substance of the control . . . Some such line must . . .be
drawn, if shareholding alone does not fuse the corporations in every
case."112 Yet, in order to preserve the concept of limited liability in
this context, some standard must be found for distinguishing cases
where piercing is appropriate from those where it is not.
Some commentators have suggested that a more rational test
would be based on some sort of "line of business" concept on the
theory that corporations should not have the power to accord lim-
ited liability to individual departments of one operation.1 13 Aside
from the definitional difficulties in determining the relevant line of
business, there is a much more fundamental problem with such a
test: even if a parent and subsidiary corporation maintain com-
pletely separate lines of activity, the owners of the enterprise still
have every incentive to operate the subsidiary with a view toward
obtaining the maximum profitability of the entire enterprise. Thus,
the same elements of common control and the same shuttling of
funds to maximize overall utility will occur; decisions about expan-
"0 As Professor Berle noted, "there is . . .a plain interest on the part of the parent as
dominant stockholder and of the subsidiary management, as its dummy, to exercise the
corporate power not for the benefit of the corporate enterprise but for other interests which
may or may not be clearly disclosed." Subsidiary Corporations, supra note 4, at 882.
" Cf. Fuller, supra note 9, at 1379.
112 Kingston Dry Dock Co. v. Lake Champlain Transp. Co., 31 F.2d 265, 267 (2d Cir.
1929).
I See E. LATr, supra note 36, at 196, 199 (there are "limits to limited liability" where
a "single economic enterprise" is involved). This notion also appears to-be at the heart of
Professor Berle's well-known theory of enterprise liability. Enterprise Entity, supra note 29.
Professor Berle did not, however, provide any concrete indication of how the scope of the
enterprise might be delineated.
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sion, dividends, or the like will still be based on an enterprise analy-
sis rather than on an assessment of the needs of the particular
subsidiary. Hence the conclusion that the veil should be pierced in
all parent-subsidiary cases regardless of the respective lines of busi-
ness of the parent and subsidiary seems inescapable."'
The arguments above, based on the economic realities of corpo-
rate organization, might prove persuasive to a legislative body con-
sidering some sort of statute restricting limited liability as between
parent and subsidiary companies.11 5 At the present time, however,
the laws of virtually every state have been interpreted to allow a
parent to obtain limited liability by separately incorporating its
subsidiary.1 6 It is this policy of limited liability that makes it impos-
sible to support piercing in all cases by analogy to the subordination
cases discussed earlier. Although there is little analytic reason for
inconsistent rules, the practical constraints of the existing statutory
framework make a consistent judicial rule based on economic reality
impossible.
The proposed viability-procedural observance test attempts to
distinguish instances where there is some corporate justification for
limited liability from those cases where the subsidiary never be-
comes a viable entity, in the face of incorporation requirements that
provide scant protection for future creditors of the enterprise. Under
the test a parent will be held for the debt of its subsidiary when (1)
it impairs the viability of the subsidiary as a separate business
entity either at its inception or in its administration or fails to
observe the procedural formalities that would identify the subsidi-
ary as a separate corporation; except (2) a creditor who was in a
position to inquire cannot reach the parent's assets when a reason-
able investigation of the financial status of the subsidiary and its
"I Cf. Portsmouth Cotton Oil Ref. Corp. v. Fourth Nat'l Bank, 280 F. 879 (M.D. Ala.
1921), afl'd, 284 F. 718 (5th Cir. 1922), holding a corporation liable for the debts of its
subsidiary, whose affairs it dominated, even though each corporation had a completely sepa-
rate line of business.
"I Wisconsin has enacted a statute restricting the limited liability of officers of insolvent
corporations for damages awarded under a Consumer Act. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 425.310 (1974).
New York still provides that the ten largest stockholders have unlimited liability to wage
earners. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 630(a)(McKinney Supp. 1973).
," See Bartle v. Home Owners Coop., Inc., 309 N.Y. 103, 127 N.E.2d 832 (1955); North
v. Higbee Co., 131 Ohio St. 507, 3 N.E.2d 391 (1936); American Trading & Production Corp.
v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 412 (N.D. Ill. 1970); cf. Anderson v. Abbott, 321
U.S. 349, 361-62 (1944); Elenkrieg v. Siebrecht, 238 N.Y. 254, 260, 144 N.E. 519, 521 (1924).
One can regard this issue as being essentially resolved in Berkey v. Third Avenue Ry. Co.,
244 N.Y. 84, 155 N.E. 58 (1926). The majority opinion of Justice (then Judge) Cardozo and
the dissent of Judge Crane clearly focus the question of the separate existence of the subsidi-
ary.
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relation to its parent would have indicated the shallowness of the
subsidiary's resources. As in the approach to subordination sug-
gested herein, this equation disregards factors inherent in the
parent-subsidiary relationship, even though they are widely re-
counted in veil-piercing cases. For example, since stockholders al-
ways control the corporation," 7 control-both in the policy making
and operational sense-is always a brooding presence regardless of
whether it is actually exercised. The degree to which control is exer-
cised will vary, depending on the parent's perception of the most
efficient use of the subsidiary. Thus whether the constituent corpo-
rations share officers or directors is largely irrelevant."' Also missing
from the proposed equation are the labels that many courts have
used in desperation in veil-piercing cases: descriptions of the subsid-
iary as an "alter-ego," "instrumentality," "agent" or the like are
conclusory, and generalized discussions about fraudulent and un-
just conduct do no more than state the problem."9 Finally, the test
does not require a showing of fraudulent activity, concealment, or
any other form of tortious or illegal activity.2 ' While such activity
would support piercing, a requirement that illegality be a factor
would limit piercing to cases where the transfers were avoidable in
any case.
The main advantage of the viability-procedural observance
doctrine is that it produces standards conforming to the corporate
law that can be applied in a rational manner. To some extent, the
doctrine compels the court to compare the subsidiary corporation
with an independent enterprise, a model that serves as a proper
norm of corporate activity. If the operations of the subsidiary de-
viate greatly from that norm, the parent corporation forfeits the
legislative grant of limited liability.
3. Bankruptcy Authority. There is a surprising dearth of
bankruptcy authority on the veil piercing question. Most bank-
ruptcy cases are either subordination cases or cases where two or
more related companies are bankrupt and the true contest is be-
"' See Fisser v. International Bank, 282 F.2d 231, 238 (2d Cir. 1960); American Trading
& Production Corp. v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 412 (N.D. Ill. 1970); E. LArry,
supra note 36, at 218; Rembar, supra note 24, at 910; Cataldo, supra note 1, at 488-89; Douglas
& Shanks, supra note 85, at 196.
"' See Berger v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 453 F.2d 991 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 848 (i972); Steven v. Roscoe Turner Aeronautical Corp., 324 F.2d 157 (7th
Cir. 1963); Cataldo, supra note 1, at 488-89; HARVARD NOTE, supra note 99, at 1126-28.
"I See Horowitz, supra note 93, 14 WASH. L. REv. at 286-87; Cataldo, supra note 1, at
497; Douglas & Shanks, supra note 85, at 195-96.
"2 See National Marine Service, Inc., v. C.J. Thibodeaux & Co., 501 F.2d 940, 942 (5th
Cir. 1974); Francis 0. Day Co. v. Shapiro, 267 F.2d 669 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
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tween creditors of the respective corporations. Most trustees have
been content to subordinate the claims of corporate parents without
attempting an affirmative recovery against the parent.121 Yet as
noted above, the Supreme Court did indicate in Consolidated Rock
Products v. Du Bois122 that a parent corporation could be liable for
the debts of its subsidiary. In that case the Court suggested a con-
ventional test for piercing based on commingling of funds, failure
to observe the proper formalities, and the maintenance of a unified
operation with the subsidiary functioning as a department of the
parent. Yet this case is not strong authority. First, there was no
attempt to require the parent to respond to an affirmative judg-
ment. The litigation was between creditors of the subsidiaries and
stockholders of the parent as claimants in a reorganization proceed-
ing. To the extent that the creditors prevailed, the stockholders
would have received a lesser interest in the reorganized company.
Second, even though it suggested that a veil piercing action might
be appropriate, the Court was oblivious to the source of the applica-
ble law-state law (and if so what state's), federal bankruptcy law,
or federal common law.
The only reported decision holding the parent liable to the cred-
itors of a bankrupt subsidiary is Henderson v. Rounds and Porter
Lumber Co.1 23 In that case the court cited traditional veil piercing
cases decided at the instance of a single creditor and suggested that
the test to be used was whether the parent dominated and manipu-
lated the affairs of the bankrupt subsidiary for its own benefit and
to advance its own interest. The requisite abuse of control was easily
found since the parent had forced the subsidiary to sell it wood
flooring at a substantial loss and at a price far below the current
market price. Moreover, there was substantial evidence that the
parent knew that if the practice continued, the subsidiary would
"I See Palmer v. Stokely, 255 F. Supp. 674 (W.D. Okla. 1966), holding that fraudulent
intercompany transfers may be set aside; despite having a basis for piercing the veil, the
trustee evidently failed to argue that the parent should be liable for all the bankrupt's debts.
In several cases, courts that subordinated claims of parent corporations refused to hold those
same parents liable for the debts of their subsidiaries. In Centmont Corp. v. Marsch, 68 F.2d
460 (1st Cir. 1933), cert. denied, 291 U.S. 680 (1934), the claim of the parent corporation in
its bankrupt subsidiary was subordinated. But in Marsch v. Southern New England R.R.,
230 Mass. 483, 120 N.E. 120 (1918), the same creditor who had procured the subordination
failed in his attempt to reach the parent's assets. See Cataldo, supra note 1, at 497 n.95.
', 312 U.S. 510 (1941).
in 99 F. Supp. 376 (W.D. Ark. 1951). The corporate veil was pierced to reach an individ-
ual stockholder in Eubanks v. Allstate Ins. Co., 441 F.2d 7 (5th Cir. 1971), but the Court of
Appeals rested its decision on a Georgia statute making the organizers of a corporation liable
for all its debts if they have failed to provide minimum capitalization.
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ultimately be forced into bankruptcy. The court did not attempt a
comprehensive analysis of the problem of piercing in bankruptcy.24
Since state law must be applied to the veil piercing issues and
since the matter is intimately related to the requirements the state
imposes for limited liability, it would seem appropriate for bank-
ruptcy courts to adopt the proposed viability-procedural observance
test. 2 The test appears to strike a proper balance between the state-
created right of limited liability and the economic realities of multi-
ple incorporation. But in applying this test, the courts should not
consider the fact that some general creditors might be estopped
from recovering from the parent for the subsidiary's debt. This con-
clusion is based partly on a countervailing notion of estoppel: since
it is the parent's conduct or lack of it that neutralizes the statutory
policy of limited liability, the parent should not be heard to com-
plain. A second reason on the bankruptcy level is that, in analogous
actions when the trustee prosecutes rights of particular creditors,
the benefits accrue equally to all general creditors and not only to
those creditors whose rights the trustee is asserting. 2 Since the
trustee's power in essence comes from that of the creditors, there
should be no distinction among different general creditors.
IV. THE PROBLEM OF RELATED BANKRUPTS AS ENTITIES
SEPARATE OR CONSOLIDATED IN BANKRUPTCY
All of the foregoing analysis was based on the assumption that
only one of the constituent corporations-an affiliate or a subsidi-
ary-would be in bankruptcy. Different problems arise when a
bankrupt parent owns the stock of solvent subsidiaries or when both
the parent and its subsidiary, or several affiliates, become bankrupt
at about the same time.
If the parent is bankrupt, it is settled that the stock it holds in
its subsidiary is an asset that can be sold for the benefit of credi-
tors.'2 If the subsidiary is able to pay all of its creditors and the
2 -The precedural posture in Henderson was as follows: a state court action was brought
by the trustee in bankruptcy and the creditors; the defendants removed on diversity grounds.
While the court found the question of the creditors' standing "not free from doubt," it
nevertheless allowed all claims to be adjudicated. The same general disregard of the standing
question was apparent in Long v. McGlon, 263 F. Supp. 96 (D.S.C. 1967), in which an action
to pierce the corporate veil withstood a motion to dismiss.
"2 The two reported cases seem to apply the same veil piercing standard in bankruptcy
that is applied in cases brought by a single creditor. Long v. McGlon, 263 F. Supp. 96 (D.S.C.
1967); Henderson v. Rounds & Porter Lumber Co., 99 F. Supp. 376 (W.D. Ark. 1951).
i Moore v. Bay, 284 U.S. 4 (1931).
227 See Wilson v. Williams Hardware Co., 32 F.2d 103, 104 (4th Cir. 1929); In re Seatrade
Corp., 255 F. Supp. 696, 702 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd sub nom., Chemical Bank v. Kheel, 369 F.2d
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parent's holdings in its stock can then be sold at a price sufficient
to discharge the liabilities of the parent in full, the creditors of
neither parent nor subsidiary would have any particular interest in
how the subsidiary is treated for bankruptcy purposes. As might be
expected, such cases are quite rare. Usually, the assets of the parent
and the subsidiary, taken together, are insufficient to satisfy all the
creditors' claims: if the subsidiary is solvent and its creditors are
paid first, the funds that remain will generally be inadequate to pay
the creditors of the parent in full, and if the subsidiary is insolvent,
there will be no funds left over for creditors of the parent. Thus, in
the typical situation, the contest is between creditors of the parent
or an affiliate on the one hand, and creditors of the subsidiary or
the other affiliate on the other. Since the parent or affiliate is insol-
vent in the bankruptcy sense, that is, its liabilities to creditors
exceed its assets, no stockholder interests remain to be protected.
There are two approaches that can be used in adjusting the
competing interests of these groups of creditors. One is to maintain
the separate identities of the companies, largely ignoring the rela-
tionship between them. Where both constituent corporations are
bankrupt, each bankrupt may file claims in the other's bankruptcy
proceeding (subject to possible subordination), assets will be allo-
cated between the bankrupts in proportion to their respective inter-
ests in the properties, and the resulting estates will be distributed
to each company's individual creditors. To the extent that creditors
have claims against both bankrupts for the same obligation, they
may file claims in both bankruptcies, though they will be entitled
to only one satisfaction. Where only the parent is bankrupt, the
subsidiary may be liquidated, its creditors paid, and the surplus
given to the parent's trustee; alternatively, the subsidiary's stock
may be sold, leaving it to the new owners of the stock to pay the
subsidiary's liabilities.
The other approach is to consolidate the assets and liabilities
of the parent and subsidiary, forcing creditors of both companies to
look to a common pool of assets for satisfaction of their claims.
While the law governing the treatment of creditors holding claims
against both companies for the same obligation is not well devel-
oped, it seems likely that such creditors will be relegated to a single
845 (2d Cir. 1966) (assets of wholly owned subsidiary included in estate of bankrupt); cf.
Commerce Trust Co. v. Woodbury, 77 F.2d 478 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 614 (1935).
Several cases have indicated that, absent a consolidation or turnover order, a reorganization
court has no direct power over the assests of a subsidiary of the debtor. In re South Jersey
Land Corp., 361 F.2d 610 (3d Cir. 1966); In re Adolf Gobel, Inc., 80 F. 2d 849 (2d Cir. 1936).
But cf. Greenhall v. Carnegie Trust Co., 180 F. 812 (S.D.N.Y. 1910).
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claim."2 8 Finally, and perhaps most significantly, all intercompany
claims will be eliminated.
When one of the constituent corporations is in significantly
better financial condition than the other, the differences between
consolidation, on the one hand, and separate bankruptcy proceed-
ings or the liquidation of a solvent subsidiary, on the other, will be
dramatic. If the bankrupts are consolidated, the claims of priority
creditors of the poorer company will be promoted ahead of the
claims of general creditors of the wealthier company, and those
general creditors will now have to share the assets of the wealthier
company with general creditors of the poorer company.1 29 If the
wealthier company is a solvent subsidiary of a bankrupt parent,
consolidation means that its creditors will receive something less
than the payment in full they would have received absent the con-
solidation.
A. An Analysis of Consolidation in Bankruptcy
To focus the consolidation issue more precisely, the first case
considered will be the simple one where no creditor who may be
adversely affected by the consolidation can show specific reliance on
the credit of any of the constituent corporations involved in an
enterprise bankruptcy. A creditor who claims to have so relied must
show (1) an inquiry into the debtor's ability to pay the debt and (2)
the absence of any evidence, such as a cross-guarantee or a substan-
tial inquiry into the financial status of related corporations, indicat-
ing recognition by the creditor of the interrelationships within the
enterprise.'30 Those creditors who would be unable to show reliance
under this test include, among others, involuntary creditors, credi-
tors who made no investigation of the credit standing of their
debtor, and creditors whose conduct suggests that they were proba-
bly relying on a group of debtors rather than on an individual com-
pany.
Where no creditors have relied on the credit of a particular
constituent corporation, the enterprise factors discussed in other
contexts suggest the need for a consolidation approach to multiple
128 Rhedom Realty Corp. v. Mammoth Mart, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 381 (D. Mass. 1975); see
Landers, supra note 15, at 752 n.198.
'2 See In re Seatrade Corp., 255 F. Supp. 696 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd sub nom., Chemical Bank
v. Kheel, 369 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1966); Stone v. Eacho, 127 F.2d 284 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
317 U.S. 635 (1942).
13 See Stone v. Eacho, 128 F.2d 16 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 635 (1942) (opinion
on denial of rehearing); cf. In re Associated Gas & Elec. Co., 149 F.2d 996, 1006 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 326 U.S. 736 (1945).
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bankruptcies. If the owners of the enterprise treat it as a single
entity and seek to maximize its overall profitability, it is necessarily
artificial for the law to treat the companies as separate entities
simply because bankruptcy has intervened. 3' The case for a consoli-
dated approach is clearest where the wealthiest company was the
one selected by the owners of the enterprise to be profitable and the
other corporations served as mere adjuncts to assure its profitabil-
ity.
But consolidation would also seem in order when the owners
attempt to set up somewhat independent companies. In this situa-
tion they still have good reason to shuttle assets and capital between
the various companies, 3 ' and, despite the best of intentions, it is
frequently fortuitous which of several constituent companies of a
bankrupt group will wind up with substantial assets. These normal
"pooling" tendencies are likely to be exacerbated when one com-
pany encounters financial or business reverses, as the owners of the
enterprise attempt to keep the failing corporation afloat. Thus in
many instances one constituent company may have used a substan-
tial portion of its resources to help another constituent company.1 33
Moreover, the corporation that appeared to be in the most desperate
financial straits may even wind up with substantially more assets
than the corporation that was apparently the stronger until it as-
sisted its affiliate. While the helping corporation may have a claim
in the bankruptcy of its affiliate-unless it is subordinated or disal-
lowed-it may not be able to recoup fully the aid it has given if the
separate identity of corporations is maintained in bankruptcy.
Quite apart from the sufficiency of saleable assets, however, no
amount of bankruptcy preparation of balance sheets could reallo-
cate the time of key personnel spent on one or another constituent
company, the lost opportunities resulting from an overcommitment
of resources to a struggling company, and similar intangible fac-
tors.' 34 The net effect, therefore, may be that the creditors of the
helping corporation contribute part of their recovery for the benefit
of the creditors of the helped corporation. '35 It is difficult to imagine
any bankruptcy policy which seeks to promote such a result.
,", See Commerce Trust Co. v. Woodbury, 77 F.2d 478 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S.
614 (1935); In re Manufacturers' Credit Corp., 278 F. Supp. 384 (D.N.J.), aff'd and appeal
dismissed, 395 F.2d 833 (3d Cir. 1968).
"I See Enterprise Entity, supra note 29, at 355-56. A good recent example is In re
Unishops, Inc., 494 F.2d 689 (2d Cir. 1974).
'" Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Meikle, 61 F.2d 176, 179 (9th Cir. 1932); Barr & Creelman
Mill & Plumbing Supply Co. v. Zoller, 109 F.2d 924, 928 (2d Cir. 1940).
IU See Subsidiary Corporations, supra note 4, at 882.
' See Stone v. Eacho, 127 F.2d 284 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 635 (1942).
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As the foregoing illustrates, the attempt to allocate claims to
one or another bankrupt company is artifical at best and in some
cases may result in serious injustice. A policy favoring consolidation
of related corporations in bankruptcy as a general matter would
alleviate a considerable portion of this harshness. 3 Moreover, the
corporate law policy of permitting separate incorporation as a
means to obtain limited liability is not disturbed by bankruptcy
consolidation because that policy is designed to protect stockholders
who, by definition, are not involved when the parent is a bankrupt.
Different considerations arise when one or more creditors of a
constituent corporation can show that they specifically relied on the
credit of that corporation. When the law tells a parent corporation
that its claims in its subsidiary will be subordinated as a matter of
law or that its veil will be pierced if its subsidiary is prevented from
becoming a viable corporate entity, it is setting forth intelligible
rules for corporate managers to follow in governing their conduct.
In the case of subordination, corporate parents and affiliates are, in
effect, warned that their situation is qualitatively different from
that of other creditors and that they cannot expect parity with those
creditors. The parent or affiliate can take steps to avoid subordina-
tion by attempting to borrow the funds from an outsider whose
claim will not be subordinated. Similarly, when the rule is that the
veil of the parent or affiliated corporation may be pierced, the man-
agers of the enterprise are put on notice that nominal corporate
status will not shield one company from what is essentially an enter-
prise liability when the subsidiary or affiliate has never become a
viable corporation. If the owners perceive the risks to be too great,
they can either avoid engaging in the proposed business, conduct it
as part of the existing operations, or establish and maintain the
subsidiary as a distinct and viable corporate entity.
The outside creditor of a constituent corporation has none of
these options. Creditors who have relied specifically on the credit of
a particular constituent corporation and then are forced to share in
a consolidated bankruptcy with the creditors of other companies of
which they were unaware find themselves in quite a different predic-
"I See Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Miekle, 61 F.2d 176 (9th Cir. 1932); Wilson v. Williams
Hardware Co., 32 F.2d 103 (4th Cir. 1929). This proposal seems consistent with the enterprise
approach recommended by Professor Berle, although he never specifies a method to deter-
mine which subsidiaries and affiliates are components of a particular enterprise. See
Enterprise Entity, supra note 29. See also Note, The "'Deep Rock" Doctrine: Inexorable
Command or Equitable Remedy? 47 COLUM. L. REv. 800, 812 (1947) [hereinafter cited as
COLUMBiA NorE] (favor§ consolidation, but suggests that many cases will be so complicated
that compromise will be necessary).
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ament than the one they bargained for. Moreover, they have no
practical means of protecting themselves. Unless they hold unu-
sually dominant positions, creditors have limited power to affect the
corporate stockholding relationships their immediate debtor has
with other companies. Creditors also have little power to affect the
business transactions of their debtors; consequently, they can have
little impact on the profitability or lack thereof of particular trans-
fers.'37 Because they are unable to protect themselves and may not
even realize that they need protection, creditors who can demon-
strate reliance on one constituent company must be accorded differ-
ent treatment. '38
B. The Existing Case Law on Consolidation in Bankruptcy
The foregoing analysis suggests that the enterprise nature of the
operations of related companies requires consolidation in bank-
ruptcy unless there is a demonstration that consolidation would
substantially prejudice a creditor who had specifically relied on one
of the constituent companies. 3 ' The courts, however, have not
analyzed the consolidation issue in terms of the enterprise factors
examined above, but rather have handled it as an offshoot of the
problem of piercing the corporate veil, considering the same kinds
of factors deemed relevant in the veil piercing cases. In my view, this
is erroneous. As noted above, the enterprise factors had to be aban-
doned as guides for decision in the veil piercing cases only because
of the need to protect the legislatively mandated doctrine of limited
liability. In subordination cases, on the other hand, the enterprise
factors should be applied since they accord with corporate realities
M3 While transfers for the benefit of a related company may be attacked as fraudulent
conveyances, this remedy is only effective if the creditor monitors the activities of the trans-
feror closely enough to learn of the transfer and if the transferee remains sufficiently solvent
to respond in damages.
'- See New York Trust Co. v. Island Oil & Transp. Co., 56 F.2d 580, 582 (2d Cir. 1932)
(dictum); Stone v. Eacho, 127 F.2d 284 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 635 (1942) (dictum);
In re Associated Gas & Elec. Co., 149 F.2d 993, 1006 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 736
(1945); Hollander v. Henry, 186 F.2d 582, 586 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 949 (1951);
Subsidiary Corporations, supra note 4, at 891. This distinction was apparently recognized in
Fish v. East, 114 F.2d 177 (10th Cir. 1940), although the court did not specifically pass on
the rights of creditors of the subsidiary. Id. at 199 & nn. 5, 6.
"I If only one, or a small number of creditors have relied, and their claims are relatively
small, it may be possible to treat them as individual creditors by estimating how much they
would receive from their debtor and treating the other creditors in terms of the bankrupts as
consolidated. Cf. Irving Trust Co. v. Kaminsky, 22 F. Supp. 362 (S.D.N.Y. 1937). It is
probably unlikely that enough creditors will be able to demonstrate sufficient reliance to
upset the principle of consolidation. Cf. Cregg v. Electri-Craft Corp., 175 Misc. 964, 25 N.Y.S.
2d 920 (Sup. Ct.), modified and afl'd, 263 App. Div. 788, 31 N.Y.S.2d 845 (1941).
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and do not interfere with any legislative policy. The issue of consoli-
dation in bankruptcy resembles subordination since the competi-
tion is between creditors alone and therefore the doctrine of limited
liability is not involved. A test based on the enterprise analysis of
corporate decision-making developed herein-not on the largely
mythical theory that the owners will respect the corporate integrity
of constituent companies-is therefore proper for both the issues of
subordination and consolidation in bankruptcy. Consolidation
should generally be ordered except where the enterprise owners
clearly had reason to treat the constituent corporations as separate
entities or when consolidation would adversely affect creditors who
had specifically relied on the credit of a particular constituent.
Unfortunately, the existing case law provides little guidance on
the consolidation issue either in terms of the applicable legal princi-
ples or the factual situations warranting consolidation.4 0 In most
cases involving multiple bankruptcies, courts have been content to
subordinate the claim of one bankrupt in the bankruptcy of the
other, without addressing the more fundamental question of consoli-
dation.14 1 Subordination without consolidation will be doubly unfair
to creditors of the creditor bankrupt if the debtor bankrupt is the
wealthier company: on the one hand, the wealthier bankrupt is
treated as a separate entity and the creditors of the poorer corpora-
tion cannot reach its assets; on the other hand, however, the corpo-
rations are considered sufficiently unified that the claim of the
poorer company will be subordinated and thus will probably not be
satisfied even in part. In other cases, courts have skirted the sub-
stantive consolidation issue by ordering an administrative consoli-
dation of the assets and liabilities of related bankrupts12 and defer-
ring the question of treatment of creditors of the consolidated bank-
rupts until some undesignated later date.'
"0 Despite the fact that there must have been scores of cases in which the issue has been
faced, the number of reported cases is miniscule.
"I Henry v. Dolley, 99 F.2d 94 (10th Cir. 1938); Centmont Corp. v. Marsch, 68 F.2d 460
(1st Cir. 1933), cert. denied, 291 U.S. 680 (1934). In some subordination cases, courts have
suggested that the parent's insolvency should make a difference on the subordination ques-
tion, but have not taken the further step of ordering consolidation. See Rembar, supra note
98, at 919-20.
"I In an administrative consolidation, which is purely procedural, the same trustee ad-
ministers the segregated assets and liabilities of two or more bankrupts. Unless otherwise
designated, the term "consolidation" will be used to refer to a substantive consolidation-a
judicially-directed merger of the bankrupt estates. See text at note 168 infra.
"I Some cases do not express a view as to the rights of creditors, whereas others have
suggested that creditors of the various companies might receive separate treatment. See Fish
v. East, 114 F.2d 177, 199 (10th Cir. 1940); Central Republic Bank & Trust Co. v. Caldwell,
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The reported cases have generally been easily decided because
the courts could point to blatant abuses of the separate corporate
entities in the enterprise structure and therefore did not have to rely
on the kinds of enterprise factors noted herein. Thus the cases often
show a classic commingling of assets and properties.' The courts
did not have to rely on the inherent possibility that such commin-
gling would occur; they could cite its actual existence."' In other
instances there were inadequately capitalized firms totally depen-
dent on other constituent companies for payment of normal operat-
ing expenses. '46 Elsewhere, nominally separate entities presented a
unified public image through common advertising, similar names,
reference to the separate entities as divisions or departments of the
dominant company, and the like.'47 The cases have also involved
multi-corporate participation in business dealings, cross-guarantees
of separate obligations, one corporation's use of funds or property
ostensibly belonging to another or the payment of one corporation's
bills by another."' Finally, in some cases one business was split into
58 F.2d 721, 735 (8th Cir. 1932); In re Eiler's Music House, 270 F. 915, 925 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 257 U.S. 646 (1921); In re Rieger, Kapner & Altmark, 157 F. 609, 613 (S.D. Ohio 1907).
"' See Consolidated Rock Prods. v. DuBois, 312 U.S. 510 (1941); In re Cintra Realty
Corp., 413 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1969); Soviero v. Franklin Nat'l Bank, 328 F.2d 446 (2d Cir. 1964);
In re Clark Supply Co., 172 F.2d 248 (7th Cir. 1949); Fish v. East, 114 F.2d 177 (10th Cir.
1940); Trustees Sys. Co. v. Payne, 65 F.2d 103 (3d Cir. 1933); Central Republic Bank & Trust
Co. v. Caldwell, 58 F.2d 721, 724-25, 732-35 (8th Cir. 1932); Page v. Arkansas Natural Gas
Corp., 53 F.2d 27, 37-39 (8th Cir. 1931), aff'd, 286 U.S. 269 (1932); Hamilton Ridge Lumber
Sales Corp. v. Wilson, 25 F.2d 592 (4th Cir. 1928); In re Eiler's Music House, 270 F. 915 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 257 U.S. 646 (1921); In re Rieger, Kapner & Altmark, 157 F. 609 (S.D.
Ohio 1907).
115 In fact, in some cases, the assets of particular constituent companies could only be
determined by reference to figures prepared by a common accounting group that arbitrarily
allocated assets and expenses among the related companies. See Stone v. Eacho, 127 F.2d
284 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 635 (1942); Soviero v. Franklin Nat'l Bank, 328 F.2d
446 (2d Cir. 1964).
"46 See In re Associated Gas & Elec. Co., 149 F.2d 996, 1002, 1005 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
326 U.S. 736 (1945); Stone v. Eacho, 127 F.2d 284 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 635 (1942);
Trustees Sys. Co. v. Payne, 65 F.2d 103 (3d Cir. 1933); cf. In re Security Prods. Co., 310 F.
Supp. 110 (E.D. Mo. 1969).
" See Consolidated Rock Prods. v. DuBois, 312 U.S. 510 (1941); Soviero v. Franklin
Nat'l Bank, 328 F.2d 446 (2d Cir. 1964); Trustees Sys. Co. v. Payne, 65 F.2d 103 (3d Cir.
1933). At least some of these situations involved nominally separate sales subsidiaries or
affiliates that sold only the product of the dominant company. See Arnold v. Phillips, 117
F.2d 497 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 583 (1941) (dictum); Commerce Trust Co. v.
Woodbury, 77 F.2d 478 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 614 (1935); Hamilton Ridge Lumber
Sales Corp. v. Wilson, 25 F.2d 592 (4th Cir. 1928); In re Hal Computer, Inc., 2 CCH BANKR.
L. REP. T 65,304 (M.D. Fla. 1974); In re Rieger, Kapner & Altmark, 157 F. 609 (S.D. Ohio
1907). But see Anaconda Building Materials Co. v. Newland, 336 F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1964);
First Nat'l Bank v. Walton, 146 Wash. 367, 262 P. 984 (1928).
"I See Consolidated Rock Prods. v. DuBois, 312 U.S. 510 (1941); In re Clark Supply Co.,
172 F. 248 (7th Cir. 1949); Fish v. East, 114 F.2d 177 (10th Cir. 1940); Barr & Creelman Mill
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an operating company and a subsidiary or affiliate whose sole func-
tion was to own the physical properties; the courts have not allowed
the attempted isolation of the assets of what is essentially a single
enterprise to determine the result in bankruptcy.'
As might be expected, this kind of unitary operation has not
escaped the notice of creditors. Creditors who do business with a
group of companies under the control of one individual, a small
group, or family often understand that their prospects for payment
rise or fall with the enterprise. Creditors must appreciate this situa-
tion when the wrong company pays the bill or when a constituent
company executes a guarantee.' In sum, many bankrupts are con-
solidated, for all intents and purposes, long before the bankruptcy
court is asked to put its imprimatur upon the union. The probability
that creditors know of the common operations of the constituent
companies has permitted courts to order consolidation without a
careful exploration of the doctrinal basis for their action.
It appears that the Second Circuit, at least, may be groping
towards the kind of approach suggested herein. In re Seatrade
Corp. 1' was a classic case for consolidation. The bankrupts were
eight shipping companies, all dominated by Manuel E. Kulukundis
and members of his family. The companies were clearly operated as
a single enterprise; assets were shifted from one to another as funds
were needed and there were numerous cross-guarantees between
them. When bankruptcy intervened, Seatrade was the wealthiest
company, although it was more by accident than by design.
In dealing with this situation, the court stated that the power
to order consolidation should be used sparingly because of the possi-
bility of unfairness to creditors who did not know of the interrela-
tionships leading to consolidation. But here, since the administra-
tive cost of disentangling the commingled assets would eat up all
& Plumbing Supply Co. v. Zoller, 109 F.2d 924, 927 (2d Cir. 1940); In re Eiler's Music House,
270 F. 915 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 257 U.S. 646 (1921); In re Hal Computer, Inc., 2 CCH
BAKB L. REP. 65,304 (M.D. Fla. 1974); In re Manufacturer's Credit Corp., 278 F. Supp.
384 (D.N.J.), aff'd and appeal dismissed, 395 F.2d 833 (3d Cir. 1968); Berle, supra note 110,
at 892; cf. In re Unishops, Inc., 494 F.2d 689 (2d Cir. 1974) (in which consolidation was not
sought); In re Parkview-Gem, Inc., 2 CCH BAKH. L. REP. T 65,309 (8th Cir. 1974) (same).
But see Markow v. Alcock, 356 F.2d 194 (5th Cir. 1966). See also cases at nn. 184-186 infra.
" ' See In re Plymouth Dyeing Co., 323 F.2d 134 (3d Cir. 1963), appeal dismissed, 375
U.S. 998 (1964); Soviero v. Franklin Nat'l Bank, 328 F.2d 446 (2d Cir. 1964); In re Clark
Supply Co., 172 F.2d 248 (7th Cir. 1949); Enterprise Entity, supra note 29.
10 New York Trust Co. v. Island Oil & Transp. Co., 56 F.2d 580, 582 (2d Cir. 1932) (guar-
antee); In re Security Prods. Co., 310 F. Supp. 110 (E.D. Mo. 1969); COLUMBA NOTE, supra
note 136, at 812.
"I, Chemical Bank v. Kheel, 369 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1966), af'g In re Seatrade Corp., 255
F. Supp. 696 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
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the bankrupts' estates, the court chose a result which was poten-
tially unjust to a few creditors rather than certainly unjust to all.
Yet the court did not confine its discussion to the situation where
the cost of disentanglement was excessive, but rather seemed to
approve consolidation in a wide range of cases where relatedcompa-
nies had been operated as a single enterprise. Judge Friendly re-
acted to this approach in a strongly worded concurrence arguing
that consolidation was to be strictly limited to cases, such as
Seatrade, where the creditors had clearly been aware of the compa-
nies' method of doing business.
The court's result, though not explicitly based on an enterprise
analysis, makes sense in those terms. The corporations were oper-
ated as a unit, the separate corporations existing for tax or business
reasons or, in some cases, for no apparent reason at all. To the
extent one can ascribe a purpose to each corporate entity, it was not
to do its utmost to be profitable, but rather to strengthen the Kulu-
kundis empire. In this sense, the constituent corporations acted
rationally; it would be artificial to ascribe separate wills to them
only upon the happenstance of bankruptcy.
A paradigm case for nonconsolidation, on the other hand, was
In re Flora Mir Candy Corp.52 In that case, the Meadors company
was organized as an independent, locally-owned candy manufac-
turer in 1961. Meadors' debentures, issued at that time, remained
outstanding throughout a series of transactions beginning in the
mid-1960's in which the stock of Meadors was successively sold to
Keebler Company, Atlantic Services, Inc., and Flora Mir. The Mea-
dors debenture holders alleged that all three of these purchasers had
in some way or another conspired to siphon off substantial assets
from Meadors to pay for their acquisitions; prior to the bankruptcy
proceedings the debenture holders had brought an action to recover
the allegedly diverted funds. By the time Meadors was acquired by
Flora Mir, the owner of a group of candy manufacturers, in late
1968, Meadors was largely defunct and therefore was not in any way
integrated into the overall Flora Mir operation. When Flora Mir
filed a Chapter XI petition in May of 1969, the referee ordered the
consolidation of Flora Mir and its twelve subsidiaries, including
Meadors. If this consolidation had been upheld, all intercompany
claims-including the claim of the debenture holders against Flora
Mir for its wrongful conduct-would have been eliminated, any
claim against Keebler and Atlantic would have become an asset of
112 432 F.2d 1060 (2d Cir. 1970).
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the consolidated debtors, and the Meador debenture holders would
have been required to compete for satisfaction of their other claims
with Flora Mir creditors of equal rank.
The district court rejected the proposed consolidation; in af-
firming, Judge Friendly felt obliged to write an opinion in order to
ensure that referees would not order consolidation in the future on
such a "flimsy" basis.' Speaking for the court, he noted the follow-
ing crucial factors. First, the Meador debenture holders became
creditors when Meadors was independent and when they could not
have known about the other companies. Second, it would have been
unfair to eliminate the Meadors claim against Flora Mir, which did
not arise out of inter-corporate manufacturing transactions, and
unfair to allow other creditors of Flora Mir to participate in any
recovery against Keebler and Atlantic since those transactions long
antedated the acquisition by Flora Mir. Judge Friendly also uttered
a broad dictum, reiterating his warning in Seatrade against
consolidation in such cases. In his view, even though the companies
might have been interrelated when credit was extended, the equita-
ble remedy of consolidation was still to be directed sparingly be-
cause of the possibility of unfair treatment of creditors who dealt
with one debtor without knowledge of the interrelationship with
others."5 4
Leaving Judge Friendly's warning aside, the Flora Mir case fits
well with the analysis suggested earlier on three counts. First, the
creditors in question had clearly relied on Meadors alone. Second,
because of Meadors' late arrival in the Flora Mir group, the argu-
ment that individual companies within an enterprise have little
incentive to profit individually, but rather will further the interests
of the group, does not apply; there was no possibility that Meadors,
like the Seatrade Corporation, had artifically become the rich com-
pany at the expense of the other constituent companies. Third,
creditors of Flora Mir could not have relied on Meadors being part
of the group available to pay their claims since Meadors had never
been an active company within the group.
Judge Friendly's concern, manifested in both Seatrade and
Flora Mir, with protecting the interests of creditors who "dealt
with" one company not knowing of the interrelationship presents
the most serious challenge to the proposed consolidation doctrine.
Yet, as suggested earlier, knowledge of the interrelationship is likely
'I Id. at 1062.
154 Id.
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to be the rule rather than the exception. Moreover, the term "dealt
with" is ambigous; it is unclear how the concept applies to involun-
tary creditors or creditors who were unconcerned with the finances
of the debtor as compared with those creditors, if any, who specifi-
cally relied on the credit of the particular debtor. Finally', Judge
Friendly's approach fails to consider the likelihood that there has
been substantial prejudice to the creditors of the other constituent
companies because of the basic fact that constituent companies
have no incentive to profit individually and, indeed, will strive to
benefit the ultimate owners of the enterprise even at the expense of
their own profitability.'55 A rule rejecting consolidation in the ab-
sence of extraordinary circumstances, aimed at protecting creditors
who "dealt with" the enterprise in ignorance of its corporate struc-
ture, protects too large and amorphous a group and conflicts with
the basic realities of multi-corporate enterprises.
A more rational test would be a functional one, presuming that
the normal enterprise factors compel consolidation but permitting
exceptions where the usual incentives to operate separate businesses
as a single enterprise are absent or where creditors have actually
relied on the credit of one of the separate companies. While there is
no doctrine on the subject, the courts appear to recognize these
exceptions in fact. In Flora Mir, for example, consolidation was
improper since the subsidiary conducted substantially all of its op-
erations before it became integrated into the larger corporate group.
A similar example is In re Beck Industries, Inc.,15 in which Beck
purchased the stock of a going concern, the contract of sale specifi-
cally required the subsidiary to be maintained as a separate
entity, and the subsidiary was a separate party to the contract.
More importantly, the arrangement was carried out in fact; the old
management of the subsidiary was essentially retained, its opera-
tions were not integrated into those of the parent's, and there was
evidence that the sellers of the subsidiary's stock, as creditors of
both Beck and the subsidiary, expected to look to the subsidiary in
' See Stone v. Eacho, 127 F.2d 284 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 635 (1942).
'u 479 F.2d 410 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 858 (1973); accord, In re Adolf Gobel,
Inc., 80 F.2d 849 (2d Cir. 1936). In In re Commonwealth Light & Power Co., 141 F.2d 734
(7th Cir.), appeal dismissed, 322 U.S. 766 (1944), the parent was a general creditor of the
subsidiary and had sold an issue of debentures secured by the subsidiary's stock. The stock
was sold and the parent's trustee claimed priority as a creditor in the proceeds. The court
subordinated this claim-thus promoting the interest of the debenture holders, above the
interests of the parent's other creditors, as pledgees of the equity interest in the subsidiary
on the ground that the parent had a fiduciary duty to exercise its control to preserve the
interests of the pledgees. Id. at 736, 739.
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case of a breach of contract. Given the operation of the subsidiary
as a functioning, independent concern, the Second Circuit quite
properly refused to adopt a consolidation approach.
There is some indication that courts in ordering consolidation
have also been sensitive to the plight of creditors who could show
actual reliance on the credit of one of the constituent compa-
nies-despite the fact that the doctrine of separate incorporability
was not designed as a protection for creditors. In the somewhat
confused case of Commerce Trust Co. v. Woodbury,'57 creditors
claimed to have relied on the existence of the subsidiary as a sepa-
rate debtor in foregoing collection of debts and in advancing addi-
tional funds. The opinion may be criticized in that the creditors who
relied on the independence of the suhgidiary apparently would not
have been prejudiced by consolidatibn. Yet this is a factual matter
that does not undermine the basic principle that the separateness
of the subsidiary should be recognized when creditors are relying on
it and would be prejudiced if it were disregarded.15 In any event,
caution in the use of the reliance standard is necessary so that the
exception will not swallow the basic principle of consolidation; the
Second Circuit's rule, avoiding consolidation in order to protect
those who may have relied, goes a long way toward producing just
that result."9
C. The Significance of Fraud or Illegal Activity
The foregoing discussion has suggested that the estates of con-
stituent corporations in bankruptcy should be consolidated be-
,57 77 F.2d 478 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 614 (1935). A similar case is First Nat'l
Bank v. Walton, 146 Wash. 367, 262 P. 984 (1928).
15 See also Sampsell v. Imperial Paper & Color Co., 313 U.S. 215 (1941). This notion of
reliance might explain the Supreme Court's dictum in that case that where the estates of a
dominant stockholder and a solvent corporation were consolidated, the corporation's creditors
would be entitled to priority over the stockholder's personal creditors unless there had been
a fraudulent conveyance from the stockholder to his corporation. Id. at 219-220.
,"I For a more restricted use of the reliance principle, see Stone v. Eacho, 128 F.2d 16
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 635 (1942) (court doubts that any creditor could have relied).
Cf. Hollander v. Henry, 186 F.2d 582, 586 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 949 (1951); In re
Associated Gas & Elec. Co., 149 F.2d 993, 1006 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 736 (1945).
The reliance principle may explain to a certain extent the decision in Anaconda Building
Materials Co. v. Newland, 336 F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1964), in which trade creditors of a home-
building corporation sought to pierce the veil of the subsidiary acceptance corporations and
share pro rata with the creditors of the subsidiaries. The subsidiaries and the parent were all
insolvent. The court's rejection of the claim may have been based on the fact that the
subsidiaries sold debentures to the public on the representation that the proceeds would be
secured by home mortgage loans and that the subsidiaries would observe certain requirements
concerning the maintenance of cash and securities. Thus, debenture holders could have been
found to have relied on the credit of the subsidiaries.
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cause: (1) they are likely to be operated with a view to overall
profitability; (2) creditors are likely to perceive the separate compa-
nies as a group and to expect payment from the group; and (3)
whether any one company has a significant amount of assets to
satisfy claims is likely to be either fortuitous or the result of an
attempt to favor certain creditors over others. Exceptions should,
however, be recognized upon a showing of either reliance by a gen-
eral creditor or of certain factors obviating the inherent enterprise
tendencies of multi-corporate units. It has also been suggested that
this proposed approach is generally consistent with the results found
in the existing case law, although, admittedly, most of the cases
have presented "easy" situations and therefore have not prompted
explicit rationalizations for the doctrine of consolidation. A dis-
quieting note, however, has been interjected by some cases that
have suggested that, to order consolidation, it is necessary to show
some element of fraud or illegal activity in the establishment or
conduct of the subsidiary or affiliate, 60 and there is at least some
Supreme Court support for such a view. 6'
At the outset, it is not at all clear what the terms "fraud" and
"illegal activity" mean in this context. Such "fraud" is clearly not
co-extensive with common law fraud: a requirement that the cred-
itors must have been misled into thinking that they were dealing
with a different enterprise than their actual debtor would be plainly
inconsistent with the cases, which generally downgrade the import-
ance of finding actual reliance by creditors. Instead, the courts that
discuss fraud appear to equate it with fraudulent conveyances or
other transactions between the companies that are somehow illegal
under state law.'62 The law of fraudulent conveyances provides an
extremely unsteady basis for consolidation, however, since it cannot
be used to reach some transfers that are as harmful to creditors of
the constituent companies as the proscribed transfers. Thus, trans-
fers by a solvent to an insolvent company will deplete assets of the
transferor but are safe from attack. Moreover, cases of commingling
of assets or artificial allocation of assets and expenses may not be
reached by the restrictions on fraudulent transfers. The kind of
enterprise factors noted previously-such as the allocation of corpo-
1' See, e.g., Maule Ind. v. Gerstel, 232 F.2d 294 (5th Cir. 1956); In re Clark Supply Co.,
172 F.2d 248, 254 (7th Cir. 1949); cf. Anaconda Building Materials Co. v. Newland, 336 F.2d
625 (9th Cir. 1964).
"I In Sampsell v. Imperial Paper & Color Co., 313 U.S. 215 (1941), the Supreme Court
did not explicitly require proof of fraud, but the opinion is replete with references to fraudu-
lent activity. See also Taylor v. Standard Gas & Elec. Co., 306 U.S. 307, 322 (1939).
,62 See Sampsell v. Imperial Paper & Color Co., 313 U.S. 215 (1941).
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rate opportunities among constituent companies-creates an artifi-
cial situation that does not involve any type of fraudulent or illegal
activity assailable in the courts. In short, the presence of fraudulent
conveyances or illegal transactions does not affect the likelihood
that the creditors of one constituent company will be prejudiced vis-
A-vis those of another. The attempt to rely on fraud here appears to
be a reversion to the individual corporate will theory discarded else-
where."'3
The suggestion that fraud or illegal activity is required for con-
solidation may have been somewhat dispelled by Soviero v. Frank-
lin National Bank, "4 a case involving a bankrupt retail carpet estab-
lishment in which the trustee sought to bring into the estate the
properties of thirteen affiliates, all owned by the Raphan family.
Twelve of the affiliates operated similar retail establishments; the
thirteenth company, the Realty Corp., owned the land and building
upon which the bankrupt was located. The Second Circuit affirmed
the issuance of a turn-over order on conventional grounds: the bank-
rupt had paid all the obligations of the affiliates and collected all
the proceeds of sales; it had signed leases, provided security depos-
its, and sometimes paid rent for the affiliates; the bankrupt itself
had fostered the notion that it was part of a consolidated enterprise
by using consolidated financial statements and common names; the
trappings of separateness in the form of separate records, inventory,
and payment of normal operating expenses were absent; and the
land and building had been conveyed to Realty without considera-
tion.6 It is implicit in the opinion that no creditor had relied on the
credit of one of the affiliates. The court summarily rejected the
creditor bank's argument that fraud was required before Realty's
creditors could be put on a par with those of the bankrupt.
Apart from the fraud issue, the facts of the case illustrate the
rationality of the basic principle urged in this paper for consolida-
tion cases. Thus, assume that the bankrupt had been more careful
and kept records separately for the companies, that each company
had separate accounts and paid its own bills, had segregated inven-
tory, and that the transfer of real estate had been for adequate
consideration. Would the situation really have been any different?
Each store had overwhelming incentives to aid its affiliates and thus
I See text at note 136 supra.
Is 328 F.2d 446 (2d Cir. 1964). See also Hamilton Ridge Lumber Sales Corp. v. Wilson,
25 F.2d 592 (4th Cir. 1928).
11 In directing the turnover, Judge Lumbard noted that even Salome's veil "could not
have been more diaphanous." 328 F.2d at 448.
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maximize the profits of the Raphan enterprise. It is doubtful that
any creditor singled out any one affiliate as its debtor, but instead,
relied on the group and ultimately, on Henry Raphan. The chances
are that if the formalities had been observed, the distribution of
assets among the affiliates would have been fairly arbitrary and, to
a large extent, would have depended on the figures allocated by the
bookkeeper to various costs shared by all those in the enterprise. 6,
Any approach other than consolidation in this type of case would
exalt form over substance.
D. Procedure for Consolidating Related Bankrupts
Thus far questions about procedures for consolidation where
related companies are in bankruptcy have been ignored; many of
these questions remain unanswered by the case law. The Bank-
ruptcy Rules"6 7 sharply distinguish between an administrative con-
solidation in which one trustee administers two or more estates but
keeps the assets and liabilities of each debtor separate and a sub-
stantive consolidation of assets and liabilities. The Rules, however,
specify neither standards for ordering substantive consolidation nor
procedures by which it is to be accomplished, but instead deal only
with the purely procedural question of administrative consolida-
tion. 6'
The easiest approach to begin with is to recognize that, as a
practical matter, no court is likely to direct substantive consolida-
tion unless administrative consolidation has been ordered as well.
The simplest case occurs when the separate companies have all filed
bankruptcy petitions in the same district; then Rule 117 would
allow the court to order a joint administration of the estates. A
motion for administrative consolidation, made by a trustee of one
of the estates or a creditor of one of the bankrupts in one (or perhaps
both) of the proceedings, would presumably be necessary. This mo-
tion could be combined with a motion to require a substantive con-
solidation or the interested parties could await a decision on the
administrative consolidation. Tactically, those parties that desire
consolidation might be better off seeking an administrative consoli-
dation first, using that order to support a later substantive consoli-
dation motion.'69
"' An example of a case where the formalities were observed is Commerce Trust Co. v.
Woodbury, 77 F.2d 478 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 614 (1935). One can question,
however, whether such an observance made any difference to creditors.
187 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (1970).
See Advisory Committee's Note to BANKRUPTCY RuLE 117.
," If the bankrupts have been administratively consolidated when the motion for sub-
19751
644 The University of Chicago Law Review [42:589
The matter is a bit more difficult, however, when the bank-
ruptcy proceedings of related corporations are pending in separate
districts. Rule 116(c) authorizes a motion to determine the court or
courts in which actions involving affiliated bankrupts shall proceed;
pursuant to this rule, the court in which the motion is made appar-
ently has the authority to consolidate the proceedings in one
court."17 The motion for administrative consolidation is to be made
in the court in which the first bankruptcy petition was filed. There
is some question whether a motion for substantive consolidation
could be joined with the motion for administrative consolidation in
this situation since the court hearing the motion presumably does
not have jurisdiction over the assets of the affiliates that filed peti-
tions in other courts until all the proceedings are moved to. a single
court and that court makes the order directing substantive consoli-
dation. Nevertheless, the court hearing the motion for administra-
tive consolidation should be able to determine the substantive con-
solidation issue as well because both involve many of the same
issues and proofs.
When the bankrupt's trustee attempts to reach the assets of a
nonbankrupt subsidiary or affiliate, then of course there is no alter-
native bankruptcy proceeding available for procedural maneuver-
ing. In such a case, the trustee must bring an action against the
nonbankrupt in order to compel the inclusion of its assets in the
bankrupt estate. In some cases the bankrupt, in its capacity as a
creditor of the subsidiary or affiliate, may be able to file a petition
for involuntary bankruptcy against the nonbankrupt corporation,
and, in other cases, the bankrupt as a stockholder may compel the
directors to file a voluntary petition. 7' If the subsidiary or affiliate
is adjudicated bankrupt, a motion to consolidate its assets with the
bankrupt parent's may be made as described above.
In a number of cases, however, trustees of the bankrupt have,
for some reason, not initiated separate bankruptcy proceedings
against the subsidiary or affiliate, but rather, have sought to invoke
the summary jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court by petitioning for
stantive consolidation is made, the court may have to appoint a receiver to protect the
interest of the separate companies. Such an appointment should only be necessary, however,
if the court finds that the interests of creditors of the various bankrupts are not adequately
represented by those creditors participating in the motion to consolidate. BANKRUPTCY RULES
117(c), 201(a)(3).
,7' See Stone v. Eacho, 127 F.2d 284 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 635 (1942).
,7, See Stone v. Eacho, 127 F.2d 284 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 635 (1942); In re
Todd Bldg. Corp., 172 F.2d 254 (7th Cir. 1949). The petition may be filed in the district where
proceedings against the bankrupt are pending. BANKRUPTCY RULE 116(a)(4).
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an order to compel the subsidiary or affiliate to turn over its assets
to the bankrupt's trustee.1 12 When this procedure is followed, the
most difficult question will frequently be whether the bankruptcy
court has summary juridiction to issue the turnover order. Unfor-
tunately, the law of consolidation has become enmeshed with the
esoteric learning governing summary jurisdiction. The resulting
doctrinal confusion in both areas should not be surprising.
The basic principles governing summary jurisdiction are easily
stated. The bankruptcy court has summary jurisdiction over prop-
erty which is (1) in the actual possession of the bankrupt or its agent
or (2) in the actual possession of a third party whose claim to it is
colorable; 7 3 constructive possession is therefore vested in the bank-
rupt.17 1 In the case of constituent companies, it may be found that
the bankrupt has actual possession of the property involved, thus
giving the court the power to determine whether the property should
be included in the bankrupt's estate.1 5 More commonly, however,
the property is in the possession of a nominally separate subsidiary
or affiliate and a determination that the subsidiary's claim to the
property is colorable is therefore required.
If reliance is placed on the colorable claim basis for summary
jurisdiction, two separate issues must be faced. First, the court must
determine the substantive standard for ordering consolidation. Sec-
ond, given that substantive standard, the court must decide
whether the nonbankrupt company has a noncolorable basis to re-
sist consolidation. The first issue was discussed in the foregoing
section; thus only the second will be considered now.
In the well-known case of Harrison v. Chamberlin,171 the Su-
preme Court stated that a claim is colorable if the only disputed
questions of fact or law it raises are insubstantial and do not involve
some "fair doubt and reasonable room for controversy." 177 The lower
courts have generally interpreted this test as requiring the disputed
issue to be at least fairly arguable. Since a denial of summary juris-
diction removes the decision of questions of fact from the bank-
"'2 Under the Bankruptcy Rules, it would be necessary for the trustee to commence an
adversary proceeding against the subsidiary. BANKRUPTCY RULE 701(1).
273 See text at note 177 infra.
'7, See Landers, supra note 15, at 741-42 (reviewing authorities).
m See In re Eiler's Music House, 270 F. 915 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 257 U.S. 646 (1921);
Fish v. East, 114 F.2d 177, 188-89 (10th Cir. 1940); Hamilton Ridge Lumber Sales Corp. v.
Wilson, 25 F.2d 592 (4th Cir. 1928); cf. Bank of California v. McBride, 132 F.2d 769, 771-72
(9th Cir. 1943).
'7, 271 U.S. 191 (1926).
'" Id. at 195.
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ruptcy judge, it would seem reasonable for the test for summary
jurisdiction to be analogous to the test for summary judgment in
civil trials. Under this standard, cases simply presenting disputed
issues of law would be appropriate for summary jurisdiction.1 78
While the courts have not explicitly moved this far in establish-
ing standards for summary jurisdiction in consolidation cases, it
appears that in many decisions this approach has been adopted in
fact. Thus, in several cases where there were no material factual
disputes over the organization of the various constituent companies,
the courts have held summary jurisdiction proper even though dis-
puted legal issues existed. 79 In other cases, the denial of summary
jurisdiction was apparently intermixed with denial of consolidation
on the merits; in at least some of these cases, the trustee must be
faulted for his failure to develop a full picture of the relations of the
companies involved.' But if a full presentation reveals the presence
of disputed factual issues, there is no alternative under present law
but to bring a separate action in an appropriate state or federal
court to recover the assets.'
E. Applying the Consolidation Principle in Bankruptcy
If the substantive and procedural obstacles to consolidation are
overcome, a number of technical questions, for which there is little
bankruptcy precedent, remain to be considered.
1. Filing of Claims. Creditors have six months after the first
date set by the bankruptcy court for the first meeting of creditors
to file their claims. 81 If two bankrupt estates are consolidated, the
court will invariably order timely claims filed in either original pro-
ceeding to be considered valid in the consolidated proceeding. The
I See Landers, supra note 15, at 742-43.
See Sampsell v. Imperial Paper & Color Co., 313 U.S. 215 (1941); In re Cintra Realty
Corp., 413 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1969); Soviero v. Franklin Nat'l Bank, 328 F.2d 446 (2d Cir. 1964);
In re Plymouth Dyeing Co., 323 F.2d 134 (3d Cir. 1963), appeal dismissed, 375 U.S. 998 (1964);
In re Clark Supply Co., 172 F.2d 248 (7th Cir. 1949); Fish v. East, 114 F.2d 177, 189 (10th
Cir. 1940); Central Republic Bank & Trust Co. v. Caldwell, 58 F.2d 721, 725 (8th Cir. 1932).
In some of these cases, the issue of the respective rights of creditors of the various companies
was postponed for later consideration.
"I See Fox Jewelry Corp. v. Lee, 264 F.2d 720 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 815 (1959).
In Maule Ind. v. Gerstel, 232 F.2d 294 (5th Cir. 1956), it is not clear why the state court
receiver of the subsidiary, who appeared at the hearing and interposed no jurisdictional
objection, did not consent to summary jurisdiction.
18, Bankruptcy Act § 23, 11 U.S.C. § 46 (1970). Adoption of the Proposed Bankruptcy
Act will resolve all of these jurisdictional issues in favor of jurisdiction before the bankruptcy
judge. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES-H, supra
note 43, §§ 2-201(a)(5), (9).
1,2 BANKRUPTcY RuLE 302(e).
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question remains, however, whether an additional period of time
should be given. It can be argued that creditors of the poorer com-
pany might not have bothered to file because the prospects of recov-
ery were so bleak before the consolidation. The reply to this argu-
ment is that in many bankruptcies creditors do not know within six
months of bankruptcy whether assets will be available, and if they
decide not to file, they are not included even if unforeseen assets do
happen to materialize; it is irrelevant that the unforeseen assets
result from the consolidation rather than from some newly found
property or unexpected recovery. Although there is no firm author-
ity on this point, perhaps the bankruptcy judge should give a short
extension only to creditors who were affirmatively led to believe that
filing would be useless. 18 3 If the six month period has not expired for
one of the consolidated bankrupts, its creditors must be given at
least the balance of the time to file. If the consolidation is accom-
plished by a turnover, notice must be given to creditors of the sub-
sidiary or affiliate involved that they have six months to file claims.
In such cases it is at least arguable that creditors of the other com-
pany should also be given the balance of the time left.
2. Avoidance of Transfers. Several sections of the Bankruptcy
Act avoid transfers made within four months or a year of bank-
ruptcy. 184 Some of these sections require a finding that the bankrupt
was insolvent at the time of the transfer. This requirement raises
three related questions. First, where insolvency is required, is it the
insolvency of the particular transferor or the insolvency of the re-
lated corporations that is relevant? Second, if the companies be-
came bankrupt at different times, is the applicable date for deter-
mining the four month and one year periods the date of the first
filing or the date on which the petition regarding the particular
transferor was filed? Third, if one of the companies made a transfer
to or for the benefit of another constituent company that would have
been fraudulent if separate companies had been involved, does the
consolidation affect the fraudulent character of the transfer? At the
present time, there is virtually no authority to help in deciding these
questions.
All these questions are in reality species of the same problem:
the extent to which the principle of consolidation should be permit-
'1 Cf. BANKRUPTCY RULEs 302(e)(3), (4). The latter provision directs the bankruptcy
judge to allow creditors additional time to file claims if it appears that an initial determina-
tion that there would be no dividend is erroneous.
I" Bankruptcy Act § 67d, 11 U.S.C. § 107(d) (1970). When state law is used to attack
the transfer under § 70e, 11 U.S.C. § 110(e), a longer period of time may be employed.
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ted to reach back in time to affect the character of transactions
undertaken by one of the constituent companies. A logical solution
would be to apply the same test for pre-bankruptcy consolidation
as has been suggested for post-bankruptcy consolidation. Thus, con-
solidation of the affairs of constituent companies would reach back
in time unless creditors could demonstrate substantial reliance on
the separate status of one of the constituent companies and substan-
tial prejudice from recognition of the consolidation.
3. Fraudulent Conveyances. A typical transaction involving
related companies occurs when one constituent company (C-1)
makes a purchase or repays a debt, using funds or collateral belong-
ing to its constituent company (C-2) to effectuate the transaction
with the third party seller or creditor (T). The transfer of the funds
or property of C-2 to T may be attacked by the creditors of C-2 as a
fraudulent conveyance. Both the Uniform Act and section 67d of the
Bankruptcy Act declare transfers to be fraudulent when they are
without fair consideration and the transferor is in one of various
states of financial distress-that is, when the transferor is insolvent,
has unreasonably small capital, or expects to incur debts that it will
be unable to pay. "Fair consideration" requires that property be
received or an antecedent debt satisfied. While not explicitly stated,
the clear import of the statutes is that the party receiving the prop-
erty or the party whose debt is satisfied must be the transferor (C-
2). The receipt of property by a related company (C-1) or the satis-
faction of a debt of a related company, therefore, would not satisfy
this requirement."5 Yet, both the Uniform Act and section 67d pro-
vide that if the transferee (T) gives new value or property, the trans-
fer is immune from attack to the extent of the new value so long as
the transferee acted in good faith. But in the triangular situation
outlined above, the transferee may not be immunized because the
new consideration passes, not to the transferor, but rather to an-
other constituent corporation. T is clearly exposed to attack as a
fraudulent transferee.
As a practical matter, a transfer by one constituent corporation
for the benefit of another constituent company may make good
sense both for the enterprise as a whole and for the transferee.
Indeed, the managers of the enterprise would be acting irrationally
if they failed to use the resources of one company to salvage another,
191 See In re B-F Bldg. Corp., 312 F.2d 691 (6th Cir. 1963); Barr & Creelman Mill &
Plumbing Supply Co. v. Zoller, 109 F.2d 924 (2d Cir. 1940); In re Security Prods. Co., 310 F.
Supp. 110 (E.D. Mo. 1969); Bennett v. Rodman & English, Inc., 2 F. Supp. 355 (E.D.N.Y.),
afl'd, 62 F.2d 1064 (2d Cir. 1932).
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if such assistance would ultimately enhance the profitability of the
corporate enterprise. And the transferee (T) is interested in addi-
tional sales or the payment of an antecedent debt and therefore is
usually unconcerned with the source of payment. In this case there
is no fraudulent transfer in the traditional sense; but, to the extent
that T places new value in the hands of a company other than the
transferor (C-2), the transferor's creditors should have access to the
property received. This result is accomplished by consolidation.
Insofar as an antecedent debt of C-1 is paid, the transferee (T) has
received a classic preference and the overall estate of the consoli-
dated debtors has been depleted by the amount of the payment.
From the viewpoint of C-2's creditors, however, there are two
crucial differences between an attack as a fraudulant conveyance
and as a preferential transfer: first, a conveyance alleged to be
fraudulent may be attacked if made within one year (and sometimes
substantially longer) of the filing of the bankruptcy petition, while
a preferential transfer must have occurred within four months of the
petition; second, a preferential transfer is voidable only if the trans-
feree had reason to know of the bankrupt's insolvency, while fraudu-
lent transfers are voidable without regard to the transferee's knowl-
edge. Consequently, in the case of consolidation the trustee's at-
tempt to attack a transfer by C-2 to pay an antecedent debt of C-1
as a fraudulent conveyance should be successfully resisted by rely-
ing on the enterprise nature of the separate bankrupts and on the
absence of any factors supporting separate recognition of the various
bankrupts.8 The recipient of the payment should, however, still be
vulnerable to a preference claim, since the transfer to him drained
off assets that would otherwise have been shared by all the creditors
of the enterprise.
4. Insolvency. The trustee for consolidated debtors may at-
tempt to avoid pre-bankruptcy transfers pursuant to sections 60,
67a, or 67d of the Bankruptcy Act. All these sections require that
the bankrupt be insolvent at the time of the transfer. It is unclear
whether the determination of insolvency must be made on the basis
of the assets and liabilities of the transferor alone or on a consoli-
dated basis for all the constituent companies.
Mayo v. Pioneer Bank & Trust Co., 270 F.2d 823, 830 (5th Cir. 1959), cert. denied,
362 U.S. 962 (1960); Barr & Creelman Mill & Plumbing Supply Co. v. Zoller, 109 F.2d 924
(2d Cir. 1940); McNellis v. Raymond, 287 F. Supp. 232, 238-39 (N.D.N.Y. 1968), modified
on other grounds, 420 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1970); cf. In re Security Prods. Co., 310 F. Supp. 110
(E.D. Mo. 1969), holding that a bank cannot resist fraudulent conveyance by argument that
joint debtors should be treated as one; there is no indication that bank sought formal consoli-
dation.
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Several factors favor determining insolvency on a consolidated
basis. First, as noted above, an enterprise analysis suggests that
fortuities largely determine which assets will wind up in the hands
of a particular constituent company, especially if there have been
substantial inter-company transfers or if most of the tangible prop-
erty has been placed in a single corporate unit. Second, from the
point of view of creditors of the enterprise, symmetry requires com-
parable treatment of pre-bankruptcy transfers and post-bankruptcy
claims. If creditors of the richest constituent company must share
pari passu with creditors of poorer ones, there seems to be no good
reason to treat a creditor differently simply because he happened to
get paid before bankruptcy. The purpose of the lien avoidance and
anti-preference provisions is to ensure that creditors who try to get
some advantage over their fellows prior to bankruptcy receive equal
treatment; such a purpose would be frustrated by applying the prin-
ciple of consolidation differently to those creditors who participated
in voidable transactions before the bankruptcy and those who must
compete for the bankrupt's assets afterwards.' Third, in some cases
where there was not even a formal consolidation of the subsidiary
and parent, the payment has been treated as preferential because
the subsidiary's property was considered to be that of the parent.'88
In these cases, insolvency must be determined on an overall basis;
there seems to be no reason to apply a different rationale when a
formal consolidation is ordered.
Assuming that in the usual case insolvency should be deter-
mined on a consolidated basis, the question remains whether an
exception should be made when the creditor can show reliance on a
particular entity in receiving a preferential payment or acquiring a
voidable lien. The answer is negative. A creditor may rely on the
corporation in extending credit because he is still awaiting perform-
ance on the corporation's part. But a creditor receiving payment or
obtaining a voidable lien is, by definition, not relying on anything
because he is receiving payment.' 9 In other words, a creditor might
say that he would not have extended credit if he had expected a
"I In most of these cases, the creditor will be protected because he had no reason to know
of the debtor's insolvency. If the transferor is solvent, then the transferee presumably must
have reason to know of both the possibility of consolidation and the insolvency of the various
corporations as consolidated.
"I See text at note 172 supra; Siegel v. Municipal Capital Corp., 102 F.2d 905 (2d Cir.
1939); Hillebrand v. Sav-Co, 353 F. Supp. 19 (E.D. Ill. 1972); cf. Bank of California v.
McBride, 132 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1943).
"I But see Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Meikle, 61 F.2d 176, 182 (9th Cir. 1932) (dissenting
opinion).
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group of companies to be consolidated, but he cannot rationally
claim to have accepted payment or acquired a lien in reliance on the
solvency of one company. For, if he had known the companies were
insolvent, his only course of action would have been to accept the
payment or lien anyway and hope the transfer or lien would be
invulnerable by the time the bankruptcy petition was filed.
5. Four Month and One Year Periods. The final issue is
whether the four and twelve month periods for determining which
transactions may be avoided should run from the date of the bank-
ruptcy of the first constituent company or the date of the bank-
ruptcy of the individual constituent company that engaged in the
transaction. Once again, if creditors of the different constituent
companies are to be treated on an equal basis for the purpose of
claims, there seems to be little reason to treat pre-bankruptcy
creditors who receive payments of antecedent debts or voidable
liens any differently. Moreover, in at least some "consolidation"
cases, the consolidation is accomplished by a turnover order and
there is no separate bankruptcy petition. In such a case, the effect
of the turnover is to declare the date of one company's bankruptcy
to be the date for all. Finally, as with the insolvency determination,
creditors do not rely on the four month or one year periods in en-
gaging in such transactions; thus there is no reliance interest that
must be protected by individualized treatment.
CONCLUSION
Some years ago when Congress was conducting an investigation
of the various acquisitions of the International Telephone and Tele-
graph Company, one of the company's witnesses was asked whether
ITT officials rented cars more frequently from Avis after Avis be-
came a subsidiary of ITT. His response was that he certainly would
"encourage" it, the implication being that it made good business
sense to rent cars from Avis rather than from an unrelated com-
pany. 90
This approach seems so obvious that one wonders why anyone
should have expected a different answer. Obvious to us, perhaps,
but not to the many courts that have considered the issues raised
by related corporations in the bankruptcy context. On the contrary,
judicial doctrine seems bent on distinguishing a class of real corpo-
rations that happen to be subsidiaries from a class of evil, parasitic
subsidiaries that happen to be corporations. The practical result is
I" Hearings on Investigation of Conglomerate Corporations Before the Antitrust Sub-
comm. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 23, pt. 3, at 102 (1969).
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that the claims of parent companies are sometimes subordinated
and sometimes not, parents sometimes must pay the whole bill for
their bankrupt subsidiaries and sometimes may get by without con-
tributing anything, and related bankrupts are sometimes treated as
separate entities and are sometimes consolidated. Current decision
making tends to be whimsical, and the hackneyed expression that
"each case must be decided on its own facts" serves the yeoman's
task of substituting for reasoned analysis.
This paper has suggested that the owners of an enterprise have
numerous business incentives to operate it in a manner that maxim-
izes the profits of the entire enterprise, without regard to the profita-
bility of the individual components of that enterprise. A resolution
of parent-subsidiary issues on the basis of the existence of actual
harm or commingling of assets, of adequate record keeping or the
observation of the formalities of separate existence, is therefore in-
herently unrealistic. Although a theory of complete fusion would be
consistent with the realities of multiple incorporation, such a result
would be in direct conflict with the corporate law that permits sepa-
rate incorporation of subsidiaries and related companies and-per-
mits creditors to transact business with one separate company. A
compromise position must therefore be adopted in certain instan-
ces. Accordingly, the principle of complete fusion cannot be applied
where it undercuts statutory provisions for limited liability, where
the usual enterprise factors are inoperative, or where creditors have
actually relied on one of the corporate entities. This compromise
takes account of realities and protects those whom the statutes have
designated as deserving of protection.
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